Appeal

Equitable Estoppel Circumstances to Allow Non-Signatory to Compel Arbitration

Posted by David Adelstein on June 23, 2018
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Equitable Estoppel Circumstances to Allow Non-Signatory to Compel Arbitration

Arbitration is a creature of contract, meaning if you want your disputes to be resolved by arbitration through an arbitrator (as opposed to litigation with a judge and/or jury), you need to include an arbitration provision in your contract.   A trial court granting or denying a party’s motion to compel arbitration is a non-final order that is immediately appealableSee Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).

There are times that a non-signatory to a contract with an arbitration provision wants to compel arbitration.  For example, a signatory to a contract (with an arbitration provision) files suit against a non-party and the non-party moves to compel arbitration based on the contract.  A dispute arises because the non-party is not a party to that contract, and thus, it needs a legal basis to compel arbitration under that contract.  That legal basis to allow a non-party to a contract to compel arbitration against a signatory to the contract is equitable estoppel: 

Courts have recognized that this [compelling arbitration] can be appropriate (1) when the signatory’s claims [against the non-party to the contract] allege “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” by the signatory and the non-signatory or (2) when the claims relate directly to the contract and the signatory is relying on the contract to assert its claims against the non-signatory

Beck Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asbury Jax Ford, LLC, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D1380a (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

However, “even when a non-signatory can rely on equitable estoppel ‘to access [the arbitration] clause,’ the non-signatory can compel arbitration only if the dispute at issue ‘falls within the scope of the arbitration clause.’”  Beck Auto Sales, Inc., supra (citation omitted).  Even if one of the above equitable estoppel circumstances apply, the non-signatory still will not be able to compel arbitration if the scope of its dispute falls outside of the arbitration provision.

An example of the first circumstance was raised in Beck Auto Sales where a car dealership sued its former employee and the former employee’s new dealership/employer for a number of theories relating to their concerted effort to prevent the car dealership from winning a contract with a public entity. 

The former employee had an employment agreement with the car dealership that included an arbitration provision.  The trial court granted arbitration between the car dealership and former employee.  The new employer/dealership, a non-signatory to the employment contract, moved to compel the car dealership’s claims against it to arbitration under the employment contract.  It argued that the car dealership’s claims against it and the former employee (a signatory to the contract) allege substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by the former employee (signatory) and it (non-signatory). The problem for the new dealership/employer, however, was that the arbitration provision in the employment contract was limited to disputes between the parties to the arbitration agreement.  The scope of the arbitration provision would not cover disputes involving the new dealership/employer; hence, it was unable to take advantage of an equitable estoppel argument to compel arbitration as a non-signatory to the employment contract.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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General Understanding of Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata

Posted by David Adelstein on May 28, 2018
Appeal, Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on General Understanding of Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata

There are two similarly related legal doctrines known as collateral estoppel and res judicata.   The doctrines are designed to prevent a party from re-litigating either a prior issue (collateral estoppel) or claim (res judicata).  These doctrines are generally discussed below regarding the elements (in the case of collateral estoppel) or the identities (in the case of res judicata) required to support their application.   Keep in mind that these are nuanced legal doctrines and a party should consult with counsel to determine the application of these doctrines which are typically raised as an affirmative defense in a lawsuit.

 

Collateral Estoppel = Issue Preclusion

 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is also generally known as issue preclusion. 

Collateral estoppel applies when the following five elements are satisfied: “(1) the identical issues were presented in a prior proceeding; (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding; (3) the issues in the prior litigation were a critical and necessary part of the prior determination; (4) the parties in the two proceedings were identical; and (5) the issues were actually litigated in the prior proceeding.”  Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So.3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) quoting Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004).  

When these elements are satisfied, “[c]ollateral estoppel precludes re-litigating an issue where the same issue has been fully litigated by the parties or their privies, and a final decision has been rendered by a court.”  Id. quoting Mtge. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Badra, 991 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).   The underlined phraseology “or their privies” refers to one who is in privity with a party to a lawsuit.  “To be in privity with one who is a party to a lawsuit, or for one to have been virtually represented by one who is a party to a lawsuit, one must have an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as if she were a party.”  Pearce, 219 So.3d at 965.

A trial court’s ruling regarding the application of collateral estoppel is reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.   PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. Inlet Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 204 So.3d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

 

Res Judicata = Claim Preclusion

 

The doctrine of res judicata is also generally known as claim preclusion.

Res judicata applies when the following four identities are satisfied: “(1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”  Professional Roofing and Sales, Inc. v. Flemmings, 138 So.3d 524, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) quoting Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004).

An identity of the cause of action refers to “whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions.”  Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) quoting Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1984).   

Another way to consider res judicata has been stated as follows: “A judgment on the merits rendered in a former suit between the same parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated determined in that action.”  Tyson, 890 So.2d at 1209 quoting Huff Groves Trust v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 810 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 

A trial court’s ruling regarding the application of res judicata is also reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.  Philadelphia Financial Management of San Francisco, LLC v. DJSP Enterprises, Inc., 227 So.3d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Preserving an Objection for Appeal

Posted by David Adelstein on May 20, 2018
Appeal, Expert Testimony / Comments Off on Preserving an Objection for Appeal

Preserving an objection for appeal.  Preserving an objection for appeal.  Preserving an objection for appeal.  Repeat again and again, because this is important.  The lack of preservation of an objection is demonstrated in a criminal trial, Pierre v. Florida,  43 Fla.L.Weekly D1110b (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), which involved man wearing a ski-mask attempting to kill his ex-wife.  Of course, his ex-wife and son saw his face, but there was other evidence to support the attempted murder.   The jury found that the man was guilty of attempted murder.

An issue on appeal dealt with the scope of an expert’s testimony that tied the defendant to the scene of the crime.  Prior to the expert’s trial testimony, the defense argued that the prosecution’s expert was going to be rendering an opinion outside of his expertise as demonstrated by prior deposition testimony.  The defense argued to exclude this testimony.   The judge held that the prosecution needed to lay the proper predicate (foundation) for the expert’s opinion, and he will entertain an objection at a later time.  The prosecution’s expert rendered the opinion and the defense never renewed the objection.  Because the defense never renewed this objection and there was never a definitive ruling on the motion to exclude the testimony, the defense never preserved this issue for appeal. Pierre, supra (“But because Pierre [defendant] then failed to renew his objection during Silvia’s [prosecution’s expert] testimony or obtain a ruling on his earlier motion to exclude the testimony, this argument was not preserved for review either.”).  Moreover, the appellate court held that the trial court permitting this opinion, even if the trial court was wrong, was not a fundamental error (i.e., it was harmless error) because the jury could have convicted the defendant based on eyewitness testimony alone.

Remember, it is important to preserve an objection for appeal, particularly if it will be the basis of a potential appeal. 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

 

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A New Trial is Not Automatically Warranted when Jury Renders what a Plaintiff Perceives to be an Inadequate Jury Verdict

Posted by David Adelstein on April 29, 2018
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on A New Trial is Not Automatically Warranted when Jury Renders what a Plaintiff Perceives to be an Inadequate Jury Verdict

Juries do not always award huge jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in personal injury actions.  Sure, sometimes they definitely do.  But it is also true that sometimes they do not.  Juries can find that the (i) defendant was not liable, (ii) the plaintiff was comparatively liable, or (iii) that the plaintiff’s damages were relatively minor.  As to the latter two points, this was the issue in Black v. Cohen, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D903e (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), involving an automobile accident, where the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on an inadequate jury verdict

In this case, there was a relatively minor rear end automobile collision in 2007 causing $1,600 in damages to plaintiff’s bumper.   Thereafter, plaintiff was having right-sided neck pain and a cervical fusion was recommended and ultimately performed in 2011.  Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon opined that the car accident caused her disc herniation that led to her surgery.  Plaintiff’s medical bills totaled $240,000.  During trial, plaintiff’s attorney asked the jury to award the $240,000 in past medical expenses, $40,000 for future medical visits, a minimum of $700,000 for past pain and suffering, and a minimum of $200,000 for future pain and suffering.

The defense argued with expert testimony that plaintiff’s x-rays taken right after the accident were normal showing only arthritic or degenerative changes, and that plaintiff’s injuries were not permanent.  The cervical fusion performed in 2011 was not attributed to the 2007 car accident.

The jury found that both plaintiff and defendant were equally liable for the accident, plaintiff’s injuries were not permanent, and awarded plaintiff only $18,506 in past medical bills.  Nothing was awarded to plaintiff for pain and suffering.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial regarding the inadequate jury verdict.  One argument raised was that during the trial the defendant took the stand to testify that he was a medical student and further doing research on cancer to receive a PhD.  Plaintiff claimed this was elicited simply to prejudicially influence the jury in favor of the defense; the defense countered that this was permissible evidence to humanize the defendant so that a jury can assess his credibility.  The court agreed with plaintiff’s motion and ordered a new trial as the result of the inadequate jury award.  The defense appealed the trial court’s order granting a new trial.

Regarding the standard of appellate standard of review regarding this issue of an inadequate jury award, the appellate court quoted:

When reviewing the order granting a new trial, an appellate court must recognize the broad discretionary authority of the trial judge and apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion. If an appellate court determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The fact that there may be substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the jury verdict does not necessarily demonstrate that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.

. . . .

Regarding inadequate or excessive verdicts, this ground is a corollary of the ground asserting that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. A new trial may be ordered on the grounds that the verdict is excessive or inadequate when (1) the verdict shocks the judicial conscience or (2) the jury has been unduly influenced by passion or prejudice. . . . Regardless of whether a new trial was ordered because the verdict was excessive or inadequate or was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must employ the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion.

Black, supra, quoting Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 497-98 (Fla. 1999).

Based on this standard of review, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial and remanded the case back to the trial court to enter final judgment consistent with the jury’s (nominal) verdict:

Even if we consider the ruling as being within the “broad discretion” afforded to trial courts in ruling on motions for new trial, we would still conclude that the court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial based upon the comments about Black’s [defendant’s] cancer research. We simply cannot conclude that mention of Black’s cancer research was so prejudicial that the jury was misled and misperceived the weight of the evidence because of it and decided the case upon the fact that the defendant did cancer research. No reasonable person would conclude that the verdict was fatally tainted by this single remark.

We are not bound by any findings and credibility determinations, because the trial court made none. The court did not explain or analyze why the verdict was “grossly inadequate.” The trial court made no analysis of the testimony of the witnesses. Implicit in its finding of gross inadequacy must be a finding that no evidence supported the jury’s finding of no permanency; however, without an analysis of the evidence in the case and how the trial court would have come to that conclusion, the trial court’s decision cannot be sustained. On the record before us, the issue of liability and permanency were hotly contested, and the court has shed no light as to why the defense’s evidence supporting its case should be rejected. Therefore, we conclude that the court abused its broad discretion in ordering a new trial.

Black, supra.

As this case demonstrates, a new trial will not automatically be warranted just because the jury rendered what a plaintiff perceives to be an inadequate jury verdict.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Summary Judgment Entered in Favor of Defendant on Equitable Subrogation Claim

Posted by David Adelstein on April 22, 2018
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Summary Judgment Entered in Favor of Defendant on Equitable Subrogation Claim

I recently wrote an article how there are times when a party is seeking reimbursement for solely economic losses, their best recourse is an equitable subrogation claim.   The article also discusses the application of equitable subrogation dealing with an actual fact pattern.

Equitable subrogation, you say?  In an equitable subrogation claim, a party pays for damages (or a debt) it believes were caused by another party.  The party then pursues reimbursement against the party it believes primarily responsible for the damages or debt.  No one wants to pay for damages or a debt it believes were caused by a third party!

There are five (5) elements to an equitable subrogation claim that the subrogee, the party that paid off the damages or debt, must prove:

  1. The party (subrogee) made the payment to protects its own interests;
  2. The party (subrogee) did not volunteer the payment — it was not making the payment as a volunteer;
  3. The party (subrogee) was not primarily liable for the damages or debt it seeks reimbursement for; 
  4. The party (subrogee) paid off the entire debt it seeks reimbursement for; and
  5. Subrogation would not work any injustice, i.e., it would not be unfair.

Tank Tech, Inc. v. Valley Tank Testing, L.L.C., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D868a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) quoting Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 646 (Fla. 1999).

Notably, in Tank Tech, Inc., the trial court granted summary judgment against the party pursing equitable subrogation. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant.  The appellate court reversed for the factual reasons discussed in the article.  

As you may know from reading this blog, a motion for summary judgment is reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard of appellate review.  Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Where the defendant is the party moving for summary judgment, as here, ‘neither the trial court nor this court determines whether the plaintiff can prove [its] case; our function solely is to determine whether the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits conclusively show that the plaintiff cannot prove [its] case.’”  Tank Tech, Inc., supra, quoting Crandall v. S.W. Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 581 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).  The takeaway is that a plaintiff is NOT required to prove its entire case when responding to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the court’s job is not to determine whether the plaintiff can prove its case at trial.  Rather, the job is to determine whether the the undisputed material facts “conclusively show that the plaintiff cannot prove its case.”  Id.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Forum Selection / Venue Provisions in Contracts are Enforceable

Posted by David Adelstein on March 31, 2018
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Forum Selection / Venue Provisions in Contracts are Enforceable

If you have a dispute, one of the first considerations should be “where do I sue?” If the dispute may arise out of or relate to a contract, you want to look at your contract.  Many contracts contain forum selection or venue provisions identifying the exclusive venue governing your dispute. 

For instance, the provision may say something to the effect, “The exclusive venue for any dispute arising out of or relating to this contract shall be in Miami-Dade County Florida.”   This means that if you plan to sue you need to do so in a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, even if you have an argument that the venue should be in a different, more preferred location.  Venue and forum selection provisions are important provisions because they contemplate where a lawsuit must be brought in the event such a lawsuit occurs down the road.  While of course you hope for the best with any agreement, you know that disputes occur, so you plan for the potentiality of that risk.

As a contracting party, you have the right to contractually agree to a forum selection / venue provision; you can contractually agree to the forum governing your dispute.  Baker v. Economic Research Services, Inc. 43 Fla.L.Weekly D643a (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).  Absent limited exceptions, these provisions will be deemed enforceable.  Id.   A judicial order as to venue is also the type of non-final order that can be appealed immediatelyId.  Thus, even if you sued in a venue contrary to the forum selection provision in your contract and the trial court agreed with you, the other side can appeal this order immediately arguing that the forum selection provision places venue in a different location.

In Baker, employees entered an employment agreement that contained a forum selection provision that placed venue in Delaware.  The employees left to work for a competitor and the employer sued its former employees in Leon County, Florida.  An argument the employees raised was that the lawsuit should have been filed in Delaware, not Florida, based on the forum selection provision.  The trial court denied the motion.  But, remember, an order as to venue can be appealed immediately so the employees appealed.  The appellate court reversed the trial court finding that claims arising out of or relating to the agreements need to be filed in Delaware based on the forum selection provision.  The forum selection provision survives any termination of the agreements such that if the employer’s claims have a significant relationship (nexus) to the agreement, then the claims must be brought in Delaware.

As you can see, forum selection provisions are important because they will largely dictate where a party must sue or be sued.  Take such provisions into consideration when entering an agreement.

For more information on forum selection / venue provisions, you can also check out this article.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Moving for an Involuntary Dismissal in a Nonjury Bench Trial

Posted by David Adelstein on March 11, 2018
Appeal, Burden of Proof, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Moving for an Involuntary Dismissal in a Nonjury Bench Trial

Analogous to a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial, in a nonjury bench trial decided by a judge, a defendant can move for an involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff (party introducing evidence in favor of affirmative relief) puts on his/her case.  This is a common motion after the plaintiff in a bench trial puts on his/her case.  No different than moving for a directed verdict in a jury trial, it is a motion that carries a high burden since every doubt and inference is given in favor of the plaintiff.  

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) authorizes motions for involuntary dismissal as indicated by the emphasized language below:

Involuntary Dismissal. Any party may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against that party for failure of an adverse party to comply with these rules or any order of court. Notice of hearing on the motion shall be served as required under rule 1.090(d). After a party seeking affirmative relief in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of evidence, any other party may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief, without waiving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the party seeking affirmative relief or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits.

In a bench trial, motions for involuntary dismissal are appropriate if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, i.e., the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence that establish the elements of his/her claim(s) against the defendant.  Boca Golf View, Ltd. v. Hughes Hall, Inc., 843 So.2d 992, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  “To rule on the motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving every conflict and inference in its favor.”  Id.   See also Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Silva, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D548a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“A motion for involuntary dismissal should only be granted ‘when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a [fact finder] could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.’” (quoting Tylinski v. Klein Auto., Inc., 90 So.3d 870, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)).

In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court is NOT supposed to rule on the credibility of a testifying witness.  Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Kummer, 195 So.3d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).  This is because when:

[T]he movant [party moving for involuntary dismissal] admits the truth of all facts in evidence an every reasonable conclusion or inference based thereon favorable to the non-moving party [e.g., plaintiff].  Where the plaintiff has presented a prima facia case and different conclusions or inferences can be drawn from the evidence, the trial judge should not grant a motion for involuntary dismissal.

Id. quoting Day v. Amini, 550 So.2d 169, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

Importantly for appellate purposes, if a plaintiff is appealing a trial court’s granting of a motion for involuntary dismissal in a bench trial, it is reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.  Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Sanker, 204 So.3d 496, 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Quick Note: Appeal of Jury Instructions with Wrong Burden of Proof

Posted by David Adelstein on January 24, 2018
Appeal, Burden of Proof / Comments Off on Quick Note: Appeal of Jury Instructions with Wrong Burden of Proof

I recently talked about the burden of proof when it comes to an all-risk property insurance policy.  This article is important for insureds that have a property insurance claim and are dealing with certain insurance coverage issues with their property insurer. The case at-issue discussed in the article dealt with an appeal of the jury instructions that were read to the jury.  Specifically, the issue was whether the trial court applied the right burden of proof in the jury instructions.  This issue is reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.  See Jones v. Federated National Ins. Co., 43 Fla. L. Weekly D164a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) citing Daniels v. State, 121 So.3d 409, 413 (Fla. 2013).  

The appellate court found the the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous meaning the case was remanded back to the trial court for a new trial (with correct jury instructions regarding the burden of proof).

It is important to note that at the charging conference between counsel and the judge to discuss the jury instructions that will be read to the jury, the insured’s lawyer objected to the jury instructions that the judge was going to read to the jury.  This charging conference is important and, as the insured’s lawyer did in this case, it is crucial to object to any jury instruction that is incorrect and/or applies the wrong burden of proof. 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Do Yourself a Favor: Have a Court Reporter at Important Hearings

Posted by David Adelstein on January 09, 2018
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Do Yourself a Favor: Have a Court Reporter at Important Hearings

Make sure to have a court reporter at any substantive hearing, particularly a hearing that could result in an appeal.

Here is why. In a slip and fall action, Lago v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2599a (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The trial court’s summary judgment order provided NO elaboration or reasoning as to the basis of granting the summary judgment. It was probably a simple order that stated that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. This does not provide a whole lot of comfort to parties or even practitioners that receive an order with no reasoning. It certainly does not bring me any comfort.

The plaintiff appealed and argued that the trial court erred in entering an unelaborated order. The appellate court disagreed on this point: “‘[w]hile it might be desirable for the trial judge to specify his reasons for granting or denying a summary judgment there does not appear to be any rule or decision that requires him to do so.’” Lago, supra, quoting Newman v. Shore, 206 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Irrespective of the lack of stated reasoning in the order, the appellate court found that the reasoning was clear when reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s response, and the transcribed summary judgment hearing. (Remember, a summary judgment is reviewed on appeal with a de novo standard of appellate review.)

My guess is the transcribed summary judgment hearing was important and it underscores the importance of having a court reporter at a hearing for this purpose. If the trial court does not provide its reasoning in an order, it is not always clear what the reasoning is that led to the ruling. Having a court reporter at the hearing allows the appellate court to review the arguments raised at the hearing including any pronouncements by the trial court at the hearing.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Quick Note: Order Denying Attorney’s Fees Reviewed De Novo

Posted by David Adelstein on December 17, 2017
Appeal / Comments Off on Quick Note: Order Denying Attorney’s Fees Reviewed De Novo

An order denying a motion for attorney’s fees is generally reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.  In a recent case I wrote about dealing with a coverage dispute between an insured and a property insurer, both the insured and insurer moved for attorney’s fees after the jury’s verdict.  

In this case, the insured moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to statute — Florida Statute s. 627.428.  The trial court denied the insured’s motion.  The insurer moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to a proposal for settlement / offer of judgment it served under Florida Statute s. 768.79.  The trial court denied the insurer’s motion too.  Both orders were appealed and reviewed by the appellate court under a de novo standard of appellate review.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

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