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Evidence

Affirming Summary Judgment when there are Competing Expert Affidavits

Posted by David Adelstein on April 07, 2019
Evidence, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Affirming Summary Judgment when there are Competing Expert Affidavits

 

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” “Summary judgment is designed to test the sufficiency of the evidenceto determine if there is sufficient evidence at issue to justify a trial or formal hearing on the issues raised in the pleadings.” Because summary judgment tests the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a trial, it “is proper only if, taking the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and assuming the jury would resolve all such factual disputes and inferences favorably to the non-moving party, the non-moving party still could not prevail at trial as a matter of law.

A court considering summary judgment must avoid two extremes. On the one hand, “a motion for summary judgment is not a trial by affidavit or deposition. Summary judgment is not intended to weigh and resolve genuine issues of material fact, but only identify whether such issues exist. If there is disputed evidence on a material issue of fact, summary judgment must be denied and the issue submitted to the trier of fact.” On the other hand, a “party should not be put to the expense of going through a trial, where the only possible result will be a directed verdict.”

Gonzalez v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 2019 WL 1141236, *3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (internal citations omitted).

The case of Gonzalez is a summary judgment case that I do not agree with it because it involves competing experts — a common scenario in many types of litigation.  It is a case where an insured sued its insurer for coverage under a property insurance policy.  Each side had an expert witness that opined as to the cause of a leak, which was an important issue as it pertained to whether the water damage was covered under the property insurance policy. 

The insurer moved for summary judgment based on its expert’s opinion that the leak was the result of normal wear and tear and thereby excluded under the policy.  The insured countered the summary judgment with an affidavit from its expert that the leak was due to wind damage which was covered under the policy.   The insured’s expert, however, inspected the roof after the roof was already replaced and, thus, the court concluded that this opinion was nothing more than conjecture that lacked “the required ‘discernible, factually-based chain of underlying reasoning’ necessary for an expert opinion to be admissible in evidence.”  Gonzalez, 2019 WL at *4.  The expert also based his opinion on wind speed which caused the damage that led to the leak by reviewing wind speeds in other locations around the day of the incident.  The court found that this was also nothing more than conjecture since relying on wind speed in one location to determine wind speed in a different location is not reliable.  Id. at *5. 

The reason I do not love this opinion–where the appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer–is because there were competing experts that rendered different opinions as to the cause of a leak.  There is nothing uncommon about competing experts and nothing uncommon about the fact that experts differ as to causation (or anything else regarding their respective opinions).  Experts rely on hearsay and assumptions and there are many times holes can be poked in the assumptions or the opinions extrapolated from the assumptions.  But, in my opinion, this should create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to determine while assessing the credibility of the expert’s opinion and which opinion makes most sense as to the cause of a water leak.   An expert is not going to have personal knowledge because most experts, even the insurer’s expert in this case, are retained after-the-fact, e.g., after the leak occurred, the damage was discovered, and the loss reported to the carrier. 

 

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Then-Existing State of Mind Hearsay Exception

Posted by David Adelstein on December 09, 2018
Evidence / Comments Off on Then-Existing State of Mind Hearsay Exception

While this hearsay exception is predominantly applicable in criminal trials, it is still worth mentioning the then-existing state of mind hearsay exception.  This is a hearsay exception where hearsay is admissible, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted by a declarant (the person that made the out-of-court statement), but the declarant’s then-existing state of mind.  Naturally, the declarant’s state of mind has to be at-issue for this exception to come into play.  

For example, in the criminal matter of Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WL 6331764 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), a pregnant woman requested her friend go to her neighbor’s apartment and stop them from playing loud music.  The friend did so and a fight ensued where a gun was brandished and discharged.  The friend was prosecuted for this incident. During the trial, the prosecution called the neighbors and they testified that the woman threatened to whoop them and she was going to send somebody to put a “cap in your a**.”   This testimony came in over the objection of the defense because the pregnant woman did not testify and she was not the defendant. 

The prosecution argued that the neighbor’s testimony about what the woman said to them was admissible to prove the then-existing state of mind of the defendant (friend of the woman).   But, there were two main problems.  

First, the prosecution used the statement to prove the then-existing state of mind of the defendant, not the woman (as she was not on trial). “It is well-settled, however, that this hearsay exception applies only to the declarant’s state of mind, not to someone else’s state of mind.”  Rodriguez, 2018 WL at *2 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Second, the woman was not the victim.  Thus, the neighbor’s testimony about what the woman said was not admissible to establish the declarant-victim’s state of mind since, again, the woman was not the victim. While the defendant-friend’s state of mind was an issue since he went to the neighbor’s house on behalf of the woman, the woman’s state of mind was not at-issue. 

Thus, the out-of-court statement of the woman (declarant) was hearsay and was improperly admitted since (i) the then-existing state of mind exception cannot be used to establish someone else’s state of mind, in this case the declarant’s friend, and (ii) it could not be used to establish the declarant-victim’s state of mind since the woman-declarant was not the victim.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Appealing Correct Measure of Damages

Posted by David Adelstein on September 29, 2018
Appeal, Evidence / Comments Off on Appealing Correct Measure of Damages

In an earlier article, I wrote how economic damages MUST be supported by substantial competent evidence. 

In a recent case, Levy v. Ben-Shmuel, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2229a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), a plaintiff, after a bench trial, recovered a judgment against a defendant that included money damages associated with a claim for conversion.  During trial, and after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal arguing the plaintiff failed to meet its burden in establishing the correct measure of damages at trial.  On appeal, the plaintiff ultimately conceded that he did not establish the correct measure of damages.  The issue was whether the plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial.  The Third District held NO!  The plaintiff is NOT entitled to a new trial on damages:

We also write to clarify the law within this [Third] district, and hold, as a general rule, that where this court determines, on appeal from a properly preserved claim, that a party failed to meet its burden of establishing the correct measure of damages at trial, that party is not entitled on remand to a new trial on damages, unless that party’s failure to meet its burden was the result of judicial error.

Levy, supra (“The generally prevailing rule is that a party will not be permitted a new trial on remand to remedy its own failure to present sufficient evidence to support its claim.”).

It is worth noting that in a bench trial, “the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment may be raised on appeal whether or not the party raising the question [objection] has made any objection thereto in the trial court or made a motion for rehearing, for new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment.”  Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.530(e).   Thus, in a bench trial, a party can challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal.  In Levy, the defendant had actually moved for an involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, but had he not done so, the objection to the sufficiency of evidence would still have been properly preserved for appeal.  

A jury trial, however, is different.  In a jury trial, “where a defendant fails to timely move for a directed verdict [as the sufficiency of evidence], and raises this issue for the first time in a motion for new trial, the proper remedy upon reversal and remand is a new trial.”  Levy, supra, n. 2.  Hence, in a jury trial, if a defendant does timely move for a directed verdict on such an issue, then the proper remedy is to enter judgment in favor of the defendant as the plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial. Id.  But, if the defendant first raises such an issue for the first time in a motion for new trial, then the proper remedy would be a new trial.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Admitting a Business Record Under the Hearsay Exception

Posted by David Adelstein on May 06, 2017
Evidence / Comments Off on Admitting a Business Record Under the Hearsay Exception

If you have perused this blog, then you know if there is a new case discussing the business records exception to the hearsay rule, I am writing about it.   The reason being is that it comes up in many business disputes. Lately, there has been a trend where this business records exception comes up in mortgage foreclosure cases where the borrower argues that the lender failed to properly introduce key evidence (such as payment histories) under the business records exception. As a result, the evidence was inadmissible hearsay warranting a reversal of a foreclosure judgment.

The recent opinion in Evans v. HSBC Bank, USA, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1033a (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) is but another example of the business records exception coming up in a mortgage foreclosure case.   At trial, the lender offered the testimony of an employee of a loan subservicer to introduce the borrower’s payment history from different servicers. Her knowledge came from reviewing records. However, she confirmed during examination that (i) she really did not create the payment history of the borrower, (ii) another servicer created most of the payment history, (iii) the payment history was transferred over to her company, (iv) she did not know who created most of the entries on the payment history, and (v) she did not know the procedures used to incorporate other payment servicer’s records into her company’s records. Notwithstanding, the trial court admitted the payment history into evidence over the borrower’s objection that the payment history was inadmissible hearsay not satisfying the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

As you know from prior articles, hearsay is an out of court statement (written or oral) offered for the truth of the matter asserted.   Thus the payment history (a written out of court statement) is hearsay.   But, there are exceptions to the hearsay rule to introduce certain hearsay evidence. One applicable exception is the business records exception.

To admit a business record under the exception, a party must lay the right foundation that:

  • the business record was made at or near the time of the event;
  • the business record was made by or from information transmitted by an individual with knowledge;
  • the business record was kept in the ordinary course of business; and
  • it was a regular practice of the business to make such a record.

Of course, there is more to this with many cases discussing these foundational requirements. In this case, the witness could not properly lay the foundation since she did not know the procedures of prior loan servicers or even the procedure to incorporate their business records into her company’s business records. There was no testimony establishing the reliability of such records that is the hallmark to admitting evidence under a business records exception to the hearsay rule.   Based on this lack of reliability, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Impeachment as to Prior Crimes in Civil Trials

Posted by David Adelstein on January 29, 2017
Evidence, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Impeachment as to Prior Crimes in Civil Trials

In a civil trial, I want to attack (impeach) the credibility of a testifying witness by bringing up a crime that witness committed. Can I do this?

When it comes to impeaching the credibility of a witness based on crimes, Florida Statute s. 90.610 states in material part:

(1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment, with the following exceptions:

(a) Evidence of any such conviction is inadmissible in a civil trial if it is so remote in time as to have no bearing on the present character of the witness.

So, in a criminal trial, a witness’s credibility can be attacked if (1) the witness was convicted of a crime in excess of one year (a felony) or (2) the witness was convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the length of punishment (a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or a false statement). But, in a civil trial, not so fast – this type of impeachment will not be permitted if the conviction is remote in time that it has no bearing on the character of the witness. If the crime is so remote in time, there is no probative value to impeach the witness other than the prejudicial effect the knowledge of the crime may have with the jury. See, e.g., Trowell v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 813 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“The statute directs the court to determine whether the past convictions have a bearing on the present character of the witness. Evidence of theft and shoplifting convictions in the early 1980s with no subsequent convictions would tend to suggest that the witness no longer has a propensity toward dishonesty, and thus such convictions would have little or no bearing on his present character. Evidence of a continuing pattern of theft convictions tends to suggest that the appellant’s character in this regard remains unchanged.”).

The objective in attacking a witness’s credibility based on a crime (as permitted above) is that the witness cannot be trusted—their testimony is nothing but a bunch of lies.

The procedure to attack a witness’s credibility based on a crime is quite simple. The witness will be asked whether he/she has ever been convicted of a felony or convicted of a misdemeanor crime involving dishonesty. If the witness says yes, the next question will be to ask the witness how many times has he/she been convicted of such crimes. The lawyer impeaching the witness will already know the answer to these questions. What if the witness lies? If the witness lies or gives a misleading answer, the lawyer can impeach that testimony by introducing a certified copy of the judgment of conviction for each crime (which is usually a judgment of the conviction and the sentence). This allows the lawyer to prove that the witness has been convicted of a particular crime, however, the lawyer cannot go into the nitty gritty about the crime(s). See Porter v. State, 593 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). If you’re looking for legal advice like this in Utah you can contact a local criminal law specialist firm such as Brown, Bradshaw & Moffat or visit their website BrownBradshaw.com.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Business Records Exception (to Hearsay Rule) When Business Takes Custody of Another’s Records

Posted by David Adelstein on October 01, 2016
Evidence / Comments Off on Business Records Exception (to Hearsay Rule) When Business Takes Custody of Another’s Records

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If you have looked through the articles on this blog before, you will know that the business records exception to the hearsay rule is a very important hearsay exception in business disputes (or any dispute involving business records!). The business records exception requires a proper foundation to be laid by a witness before the records are admitted into evidence to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the records.  The proper foundation requires the witness to show that “(1) the record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was a regular practice of that business to make such a record.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Gunderson, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D2238a (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) quoting Yisrael v. State, 993 So.2d 952, 956 (Fla. 2008).

The business records exception to the hearsay rule comes up quite a bit in the mortgage foreclosure context.   This is because the loans (notes and mortgage) get assigned or assumed by a new servicer or lender and the new servicer or lender moves to foreclosure on the mortgage. Many times the issue is laying the proper foundation with the witness being relied upon in order to admit certain documents under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

In Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, the witness was trying to lay the foundation for records maintained by the original loan servicer (which was a company whose assets were purchased by the new loan servicer). He testified about the verification process of getting the original servicer’s records to the new servicer to ensure the accuracy of the records and then entering that information into the new servicer’s computer system.

The witness also tried to lay the foundation for a screenshot to show that the original promissory note was entered into the original servicer’s system / loan servicing platform. The trial judge sustained a hearsay objection and excluded this evidence because the witness did not work for the original servicer and had no personal knowledge as to its computer system / servicing platform.   The trial court also excluded the loan payment history and the default letter that was entered into the original servicer’s computer system as hearsay. As a result, the loan servicer could not support a mortgage foreclosure claim and the court entered judgment in favor of the homeowners.

The appellate court reversed finding that the documents that the trial court excluded as hearsay were admissible under the business records exception even though the new loan servicer took custody of the original servicer’s records:

Where a business takes custody of another business’s records and integrates them within its own records, the acquired records are treated as having been ‘made’ by the successor business, such that both records constitute the successor business’s singular ‘business record.’ [T]he authenticating witness need not be ‘the person who actually prepared the business records.’ As such, it is not necessary to present a witness who was employed by the prior servicer or who participated in the boarding process. Rather, the records of a prior servicer are admissible where the current note holder presents testimony that it had procedures in place to check the accuracy of the information it received from the previous note holder. The testifying witness just need[s] [to] be well enough acquainted with the activity to provide testimony. Once this predicate is laid, the burden is on the party opposing the introduction to prove the untrustworthiness of the records

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, supra (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Improperly Admitting Hearsay can still be Harmless Error

Posted by David Adelstein on September 03, 2016
Evidence / Comments Off on Improperly Admitting Hearsay can still be Harmless Error

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I have discussed the hearsay rule (the evidentiary exclusionary rule and the numerous exceptions) ad nauseam and will continue to do so because it is such an important aspect of a civil trial. There will invariably be an objection under the hearsay rule during trial. The trial court will either sustain the objection or overrule the objection, perhaps under an exception to the hearsay rule.

What if a trial court makes a mistake—it happens—and overrules a hearsay objection and admits hearsay evidence? As previously mentioned, an appellate court will review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard of review, limited by Florida’s rules of evidence.

In Johnson v. State, 2016 WL 446889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)—yes, a criminal case—a defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling a hearsay objection and admitting hearsay evidence / testimony. During the trial, the defendant objected when the responding police officer was asked to testify how the victim and the victim’s friend described the defendant. The trial court overruled this objection and the officer was allowed to testify. The appellate court correctly found that this testimony was hearsay as it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted–that the defendant was involved in the crime. There was not a hearsay exception that would otherwise allow the officer to recount the victim and the victim’s friend’s description of the defendant.

Unfortunately for the defendant, the trial court’s error was harmless. So, yes, the trial court erred by allowing the officer to offer hearsay testimony, but the error was deemed harmless error. If the error is harmless, then the appellate court will affirm the trial court. Remember, just because a trial court commits error during the course of the trial does not mean the error will result in a new trial or a reversal.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Challenging Standard for Granting Directed Verdict

Posted by David Adelstein on June 25, 2016
Evidence, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Challenging Standard for Granting Directed Verdict

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If there is a jury trial, there will be a motion for directed verdict. But, the standard for granting a motion for directed verdict is challenging; if the directed verdict is granted, an appeal will be filed arguing the trial court’s error in granting the directed verdict.

James v. City of Tampa, 2016 WL 3201221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) was a personal injury action. The issue at trial was whether the plaintiff’s injuries from a car accident constituted a permanent injury (as this issue impacted damages to be awarded to the injured plaintiff). At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered a permanent injury, meaning the directed verdict prevented the jury from considering whether the injuries were permanent, and if so, damages associated with the permanent injuries. Naturally, the plaintiff appealed.

Regarding the challenging burden in granting a motion for directed verdict:

A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of the evidence, or inferenced made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmoving party. In considering a motion for directed verdict, the court must evaluate the testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and every reasonable inference deduced from the evidence must be indulged in favor of the nonmoving party. In there are conflicts in the evidence or different or reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury. The standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion for directed verdict is the same test used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.

James, supra, quoting Sims v. Cristinzio, 898 So.2d 1004, 1005-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Here, the appellate court had no choice but to reverse the directed verdict remanding the matter back to the trial court for a new trial as to damages. The plaintiff put on expert testimony regarding the issue of permanent damages and the defendant cross-examined the plaintiff and presented its own rebutting expert. Thus, the issue of permanency was really a question for the jury as the directed verdict would only be appropriate where “the evidence of injury and causation is such that no reasonable inference could support a jury verdict for the plaintiff…on the permanency issue.” James, supra.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Know the Best Evidence Rule

Posted by David Adelstein on June 02, 2016
Evidence / Comments Off on Know the Best Evidence Rule

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I previously discussed the best evidence rule.   Check out the article for more information on this evidentiary rule. It is important to know the best evidence rule when litigating negotiable instruments or even contractual disputes.  You do not want to try such a dispute without understanding the application of the best evidence rule.

The recent mortgage foreclosure case of Rattigan v. Central Mortgage Company, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1312a (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) is an example of the application of the best evidence rule. In this case, the lender at trial failed to introduce the written loan modification to a promissory note that increased the principal amount of the note.   The modification to the note was a different instrument than the original note (that was modified). The lender was proceeding on the loan modification and not the original note.  The Fourth District held that the lender:

[V]iolated the best evidence rule by virtue of its failure to introduce the [written] modification at trial (either the original or duplicate with an explanation as to why the original note was unavailableWithout the introduction of the modification, all testimony regarding the contents of that modification…was erroneous. As a result, there is no proper evidence in the record which could support the final judgment.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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“Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

Posted by David Adelstein on May 30, 2016
Appeal, Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on “Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

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The recent case of Arizona Chemical Company, LLC v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1213a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) is a case I discussed regarding lost profit damages. Check out that article here. But, this case also raised an interesting trial and appellate issue involving “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation argument, such as when a specific product or manufactured component fails.

This case involved a manufacturer of a specific brand of carpet suing the manufacturer of resin that was used in manufacturing the failed carpet brand. The carpet manufacturer claimed that the resin failure caused an increase in warranty claims and consumer complaints.

Applicable here is the carpet manufacturer’s pre-trial motion in limine to prevent the resin manufacturer from introducing evidence about other brands manufactured by the carpet manufacturer (that did not use the resin) that contemporaneously failed and also resulted in spikes in consumer claims. In particular, the resin manufacturer intended to introduce evidence at trial of consumer claim spikes related to three other brands of carpet manufactured by the carpet manufacturer, although none of the other brands used the resin. The resin manufacturer claimed that such contemporaneous failures indicate that something other than the resin caused the failure in all of the brands. An alternate causation argument. Makes sense, right? The trial court, however, granted the carpet manufacturer’s motion in limine since the other products were dissimilar to the failed carpet brand at-issue (as none of the other brands used the resin) precluding this “other products” evidence from being introduced during trial.

Post-trial, the resin manufacturer appealed, among other issues, the trial court’s granting of the motion in limine. The First District held that the relevance of “other products” evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. In reviewing this issue under this abuse of discretion standard of review, the First District affirmed the trial court’s preclusion of this “other products” evidence finding that such evidence was NOT relevant:

 

Generally, evidence of “possible explanations” for the plaintiff’s harm other than the defendant’s negligence is relevant and must be admitted. To establish the relevance of particular alternative-causation evidence, however, the defendant must provide a competent evidentiary link between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s theory. This threshold requirement exists as a function of the relevance rule, even though the defendant does not carry a quantifiable burden of proof as to the alternative explanation.

Here, Arizona’s [resin manufactuer] basic argument is that the excluded evidence was relevant to rebut Mohawk’s [carpet manufacturer] point that the timing of Unibond’s [specific failed carpet brand at-issue] claims spike indicates that Arizona’s resin was the cause of the Unibond defects. The excluded evidence established that other products manufactured in the same Mohawk facility without Arizona’s resin experienced claims spikes at approximately the same time as Unibond. When these two points are considered outside the context of the remaining evidence, they make a compelling case for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Of course, context is key. When the trial court’s decision is viewed in the context in which Mohawk used the evidence of Unibond’s claims spike and the limitations of the evidence concerning other products’ claims spikes, the basis for the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion in this case is understandable.

***

Arizona argues that the evidence of other products’ claims spikes rebuts Mohawk’s causation theory because this evidence bears on the likelihood that other factors caused the Unibond claims spike. The specific factors Arizona suggests are poor quality control and lack of adherence to manufacturing protocol. However, there is no evidentiary basis in the record for supplying the connection between contemporaneous claims spikes of the four product lines and these factors. The record supports a theory that there may have been some general quality-control failings at the facility, but Arizona has not identified any evidence to substantiate its conclusion that problems with quality control explained the defects in the non-Unibond products. In fact, evidence Arizona submitted in opposition to Mohawk’s motion indicates that Mohawk traced the causes of the defects in the other products to design flaws and choices of raw materials, not quality-control or procedural failures.

Without a more direct connection between the other products’ failures and Unibond’s failures, the evidence of the other products’ failures showed causation, or rebutted Mohawk’s causation theory, only to the extent that it showed Mohawk has a propensity to produce bad carpet. Introducing evidence for this purpose is improper. In light of these considerations, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the other-product evidence as legally irrelevant to the issue of liability.

Arizona Chemical Company, LLC, supra (internal quotations omitted).

When relying on “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation theory, it is important to connect the dots and create the evidentiary link between the other products’ failures and the failure at-issue. In other words, you need to create the evidentiary link supporting an alternative theory of causation by relying on the “other products” evidence.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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