Standard of Review

Writ of Certiorari to Remedy Pre-Trial Discovery Order

Posted by David Adelstein on August 12, 2017
Discovery, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Writ of Certiorari to Remedy Pre-Trial Discovery Order

Sometimes, a trial court issues a pre-trial order on a discovery issue that a party claims causes it irreparable harm.   In this situation, the only basis to appeal the pre-trial discovery order is through a petition for writ of certiorari, as recently explained by the Second District Court of Appeal:

A party seeking review of a pretrial discovery order must show that the trial court’s order departed from the essential requirements of law and caused material injury to the petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings below, effectively leaving no adequate remedy on appeal.  Generally, certiorari is not available to review orders denying discovery because in most cases the harm can be corrected on appeal. But certiorari relief may be appropriate when the requested discovery is relevant or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and the order denying that discovery effectively eviscerates a party’s claim, defense, or counterclaim.  The harm in such cases is not remediable on appeal because there is no practical way to determine after judgment how the requested discovery would have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

Westerbeke Corp. v. Atherton, 42 Fla.L.Weekly D1741c (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In this recent opinion (discussed in more detail here), the trial court in a product liability case denied a defendant’s right to perform destructive testing of a boat’s gas generator that caused an explosion. The defendant claimed the destructive testing was necessary to determine the cause of the explosion and prepare a defense. In other words, the harm imposed on the defendant could not be corrected on a final appeal since the harm prevented it from generating a sufficient defense. Here, the Second District granted the writ of certiorari because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying the defendant’s request to perform destructive testing. The take-away is the Second District’s explanation as to when certiorari relief is appropriate to remedy a pre-trial discovery order.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Insurance Policy Construction is a Question of Law

Posted by David Adelstein on July 15, 2017
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Insurance Policy Construction is a Question of Law

I am sure you have an insurance policy…some type of policy. An automobile liability policy. A commercial general liability policy. A professional liability policy. A property insurance policy.   A directors and officers liability policy. A workers compensation insurance policy. There are many types of insurance policies. I am sure you have some insurance policy to protect you or your business’s needs or risks.   You may have even been involved in an insurance coverage dispute or have had issues dealing with insurance coverage.

If you read any one of your insurance policies, you will probably be left with more questions than answers. You will be asking yourself “what does this mean?” or “what does this say?” and will often be left bemoaning “huh!?!” with every other sentence you read.  This is the exact reason why there are insurance coverage disputes.

When it comes to insurance coverage disputes and the interpretation of the language in an insurance policy, the Florida Supreme Court importantly explained:

Insurance policy construction is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Courts construe insurance contracts according to their plain language.  However, “any ambiguity which remains after reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must be liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer.”  A provision is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one providing coverage and the other excluding coverage.”  The ambiguity must be genuine, and the lack of a definition for an operative term “does not, by itself, create an ambiguity “When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning.” 

Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S731a (Fla. 2017) (internal citations omitted).

Obviously, if you have an insurance coverage dispute, you want to make sure you are represented by an attorney that understands the complexities of insurance coverage.  Nonetheless, it is imperative that you understand that insurance policy construction is a question of law for the Court with a de novo standard of appellate review.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Denial of Right to Depose Material Witness

Posted by David Adelstein on April 23, 2017
Depositions, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Denial of Right to Depose Material Witness

Depositions are an integral part of a dispute’s “truth seeking” discovery process. This is where parties can depose a witness under oath and explore key factual issues and parties’ positions, both from a liability and damages perspective.   Certain depositions can be introduced for purposes of substantive evidence at trial.   Other depositions can be used for purposes of impeachment in case a witness changes his/her position or story at trial. The significance of a deposition of a material witness in a civil case cannot be understated.

 

If an opposing party wants to limit or prevent a deposition from moving forward, that party will file a motion for protective order based on its good cause reasoning to restrict that deposition. The burden is on that party to support its good cause reasoning. If the court grants the motion for protective order, an appellate issue arises. “When a party has been denied the right to depose an alleged material witness without finding of good cause to preclude the deposition, the trial court departs from the essential requirements of law.”   Akhnoukh v. Benvenuto, 42 Fla.L.Weekly D882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). This gives the denied party the right to move for a writ of certiorari: “Certiorari jurisdiction generally exists to review the denial of a motion to compel the deposition of a material witness.” Id. (further explaining that a witness can be material even if relevant information can be obtained from a party).

 

For instance, in Akhnoukh, the plaintiffs obtained a protective order that prevented defendants from deposing plaintiff’s minor son (who was not a party). The son was the only passenger in the car at the time of the accident; he was eight year’s old at the time of the car accident and eleven year’s old at the time of the protective order. The defendants wanted to take the minor’s accident since he was sitting in the front passenger seat and an eyewitness to the accident and could shed value on the moments before the accident, the impact of the accident, whether the mother was wearing a seat belt, and the mother’s activities after the accident. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the protective order. The appellate court, however, quashed the motion for protective order:

 

The trial court did not require Benvenuto [plaintiff] to establish good cause for the protective order. She based her argument on her [minor] son’s age, lack of maturity, and experience but provided no evidence. She also did not provide any evidence of how the taking of the deposition may be detrimental to her son. The trial court made no findings of good cause and departed from the essential requirements of law in prohibiting the deposition.  Thus, we grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order granting the motion for protective order. The trial court in its discretion may take protective measures if necessary for the minor’s well-being, such as requiring that the deposition take place before the court or a magistrate.

Akhnoukh, supra.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Designating a Representative(s) to Serve as the Corporate Representative for Deposition

Posted by David Adelstein on April 07, 2017
Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Designating a Representative(s) to Serve as the Corporate Representative for Deposition

Corporate representative depositions play an important role in the discovery of any dispute involving a corporate party. A corporate representative deposition requires the corporate representative to speak on behalf of the company – they are not speaking based on their personal knowledge, but as to the company’s position regarding designated topics. In fact, the designated corporate representative does not have to have the most knowledge about a particular topic to be the representative. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.310(b)(6). See also Sybac Solar, GMBH v. 6th Street Solar Energy park of Gainesville, LLC, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D771a (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“The corporation is not required to designate ‘the witness with the most knowledge’ of the designated subject matter; indeed the witness is not required to have any personal knowledge whatsoever. And there may be a good reason why a corporation does not produce the most knowledgeable witness for deposition. For example, the person with the greatest knowledge of the subject matter ‘may not totally embrace the corporation’s position.’” Instead, the corporation is required to prepare the designated witness to testify regarding the designated subject matter.) (internal citations omitted).

Typically, the corporation can designate the representative(s) it wants to testify about the designated topics. With that said, the Second District in Sybac Solar explained that a deposing party that does not like the designated representative(s) can move the trial court to depose another corporate representative of its choice subject to the discretion of the trial court to issue a protective order.  

In this case, the deposing party moved to compel the opposing party to designate a certain individual as a corporate representative. The trial court granted the motion. The opposing party appealed –through a writ of certiorari since orders compelling a deposition can result in irreparable harm that cannot be undone on a final appeal. The Second District reversed in part because the individual had interests that were adverse to that of the company and would not be a proper corporate spokesperson; thus, the individual could not be a corporate representative for those topics.

I find this case frustrating. An entity should be entitled to designate those person(s) it wants to speak on the designated topics. The entity has a duty to prepare the person(s) to speak about the topics and the entity’s position because the person may not have, and is not required to have, the most knowledge about the topic. As long as the person is sufficiently prepared, the story should end.   If the person says “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall” during the entire deposition or gives wishy-washy answers (based on their lack of preparation), than that it is a different story.  But assuming the person is prepared, if the opposing party does not like the answers they are not precluded from taking depositions of other persons, or even the designated representatives, based on their personal knowledge. Otherwise, everyone will move to depose the person they want to serve as the corporate representative (which is probably the person with the most knowledge) which waters down this rule.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Punitive Damages for Business Torts

Posted by David Adelstein on March 31, 2017
Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Punitive Damages for Business Torts

Punitive damages can be warranted in business torts, although you are dealing with a much tougher threshold. Typically, the misconduct warranting the punitive damages needs to be intentional, i.e., the defendant had knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and its high probability of damage and engaged in the misconduct anyway. See Fla. Stat. 768.72. This is because “‘the purpose of punitive damages is not to further compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant for the wrongful conduct and to deter similar misconduct by it and other actors in the future.’”   See Bistline v. Rogers, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D706a (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So.2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999). Thus, an award of punitive damages for a business tort will typically need to require evidence showing fraud, malice, or deliberately outrageous conduct. See Bistline, supra.

A party, however, just cannot come right out of the gate and sue for punitive damages. Rather, a party needs to file a lawsuit and thereafter make an evidentiary proffer supporting the intentional misconduct that it believes gives rise to punitive damages for a business tort. What is plead is an allegation – it is not evidence—and will not support an evidentiary proffer. Again, there needs to be an evidentiary proffer with evidence reasonably showing the basis of the intentional misconduct to support an award for punitive damages.   See Bistline, supra (reversing award of punitive damages because there was not reasonable evidentiary proffer and because trial court based amendment to assert punitive damages on allegations in complaint, which is not evidence).

It is important that a party moving for punitive damages properly make that evidentiary proffer with the court to allow it to amend its complaint to include these damages. This is important in any punitive damages proffer, particularly in business tort disputes where the threshold is greater.  In this manner, the procedural requirements in Florida Statute s. 768.72 are crucial to comply with. Because an impermissible punitive damages award is difficult to remedy on appeal, a defendant will be entitled to certiorari review “to determine whether a trial court has complied with the procedural requirements of section 768.72…but not the sufficiency of the evidence.” See Bistline, supra, quoting Tilton v. Wrobel, 198 So.3d 909, 910 (Fla. DCA 2006).

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Insurance Coverage Disputes where the Focus is the Policy Language

Posted by David Adelstein on March 06, 2017
Standard of Review / Comments Off on Insurance Coverage Disputes where the Focus is the Policy Language

Insurance coverage disputes are fairly common between an insured and his/her/its insurer.   These are important disputes to an insured, particularly when they have been damaged and their insurer refuses to defend them from a third-party claim or otherwise denies coverage. An insured never wants to be in this position—understandably so. On the other hand, an insurance policy is not designed to cover every single risk under the sun as there are exclusions identified in policies for risks or perils that are not covered.   This ultimately means an insured needs to have an appreciation of those risks or perils not covered (in case he/she/it needs to procure another policy or a policy endorsement to cover certain risks or perils).

There are insurance coverage disputes where the primary focus is on the policy language. The material facts are not in dispute; the dispute is centered on whether the undisputed facts create coverage under the applicable policy. In this instance, the insurance coverage dispute is an issue for the court and not for a jury.

A recent case explains the appellate standard of review in insurance coverage disputes, particularly when the overriding issue has nothing to do with the facts and everything to do with the policy language:

We review the instant appeal from a final judgment interpreting the provisions of an insurance policy to determine coverage de novo. Where the facts are not in dispute and the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous and not subject to conflicting inferences, “its construction is for the court, not the jury.” Moreover, even where an ambiguity exists, if the facts are not disputed “it is within the province of the trial judge not the jury to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law.” Here, because neither a factual dispute nor an ambiguity was demonstrated to exist, the coverage issue raised below should have been decided by the court below and on the record below….

Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Cernogorsky, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D476b (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (internal citations omitted).

If you have questions regarding an insurance policy or you are involved in an insurance coverage dispute, do the prudent thing, consult an attorney that understands insurance.  Insurance is challenging, even for experienced practitioners, so do not assume you can navigate the complicated insurance waters solo.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Appealing Trial Court’s Interpretation of Contract

Posted by David Adelstein on July 24, 2016
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Appealing Trial Court’s Interpretation of Contract

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Many disputes turn on the interpretation of a contract, contractual term, or written document. When the trial court rules on the interpretation, there will typically be a party that disagrees with the court’s interpretation. In these instances, this party will appeal the trial court’s interpretation. There is a value to appeal because the appellate standard of review is de novo meaning the appellate court will review the trial court’s record anew without giving deference to the trial court’s interpretation.

The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law and the appellate court construes the contract under a de novo standard of review. Notably, construction of contractual terms is a question of law, which we review de novo, provided that the language is clear and unambiguous and free of conflicting inferences.

Ciklin Lubetz Martens & O’Connell v. Patrick J. Casey, P.A., 41 Fla.L.Weekly D1678b (Fla. 4th DCA 2016 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

For example, in a dispute concerning a law firm’s partnership agreement as it pertains to the withdrawal of a partner, the trial court made an interpretation of the partnership agreement that resulted in certain amounts being awarded to the withdrawing partner. The law firm appealed the trial court’s interpretation and the appellate court, examining the partnership agreement under a de novo standard of appellate review, reversed certain interpretations by the trial court. This is because the appellate court was able to examine the partnership agreement anew without providing any deference to how the trial court interpreted the partnership agreement.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Asserting Punitive Damages (or Appealing the Decision to Allow for Punitive Damages)

Posted by David Adelstein on July 09, 2016
Appeal, Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Asserting Punitive Damages (or Appealing the Decision to Allow for Punitive Damages)

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So, you are interested in pursuing punitive damages. Then you MUST comply with the requirements of Florida Statute s. 768.72. This statute provides in relevant part:

(1) In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may move to amend her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages. No discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted.

(2) A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence. As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Intentional misconduct” means that the defendant had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury or damage to the claimant would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of conduct, resulting in injury or damage.

(b) “Gross negligence” means that the defendant’s conduct was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.

It is NOT appropriate to merely plead punitive damages in your initial lawsuit and think by virtue of this allegation that you will be able to argue punitive damages to the jury. That would not be fair, would it? This would simply allow a party in every civil lawsuit to argue punitive damages to the jury. 

Rather, and as you can see from the statute, you must reasonably show by proffering evidence to the trial court that you have a reasonable basis to the recovery of such damages. But, you are able to take discovery relating to evidence you want to proffer associated with punitive damages (assuming the discovery is reasonable).   And, presuming the trial court allows you to argue punitive damages to the jury, a defendant should only be liable for punitive damages based on clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence, as defined in the statute.  The statute provides standards in order for a party to pursue and argue punitive damages to the jury.

What do you do if you are a defendant and the trial court grants the plaintiff’s motion for leave to include a punitive damages component? Punitive damages are a damages-component you do NOT want argued to the jury.

Certiorari review is available to determine whether a trial court has complied with the procedural requirements of section 768.72, but not to review the sufficiency of the [proffered] evidence.” HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. d/b/a St. Lucie Medical Center v. Byers-McPheeters, 2016 WL 3549595, *1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).  Stated differently, you can seek a writ of certiorari arguing the trial court failed to properly comply with s. 768.72, but not to review the evidence proffered to the trial court relating to the trial court’s decision to allow a punitive damages component.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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“Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

Posted by David Adelstein on May 30, 2016
Appeal, Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on “Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

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The recent case of Arizona Chemical Company, LLC v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1213a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) is a case I discussed regarding lost profit damages. Check out that article here. But, this case also raised an interesting trial and appellate issue involving “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation argument, such as when a specific product or manufactured component fails.

This case involved a manufacturer of a specific brand of carpet suing the manufacturer of resin that was used in manufacturing the failed carpet brand. The carpet manufacturer claimed that the resin failure caused an increase in warranty claims and consumer complaints.

Applicable here is the carpet manufacturer’s pre-trial motion in limine to prevent the resin manufacturer from introducing evidence about other brands manufactured by the carpet manufacturer (that did not use the resin) that contemporaneously failed and also resulted in spikes in consumer claims. In particular, the resin manufacturer intended to introduce evidence at trial of consumer claim spikes related to three other brands of carpet manufactured by the carpet manufacturer, although none of the other brands used the resin. The resin manufacturer claimed that such contemporaneous failures indicate that something other than the resin caused the failure in all of the brands. An alternate causation argument. Makes sense, right? The trial court, however, granted the carpet manufacturer’s motion in limine since the other products were dissimilar to the failed carpet brand at-issue (as none of the other brands used the resin) precluding this “other products” evidence from being introduced during trial.

Post-trial, the resin manufacturer appealed, among other issues, the trial court’s granting of the motion in limine. The First District held that the relevance of “other products” evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. In reviewing this issue under this abuse of discretion standard of review, the First District affirmed the trial court’s preclusion of this “other products” evidence finding that such evidence was NOT relevant:

 

Generally, evidence of “possible explanations” for the plaintiff’s harm other than the defendant’s negligence is relevant and must be admitted. To establish the relevance of particular alternative-causation evidence, however, the defendant must provide a competent evidentiary link between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s theory. This threshold requirement exists as a function of the relevance rule, even though the defendant does not carry a quantifiable burden of proof as to the alternative explanation.

Here, Arizona’s [resin manufactuer] basic argument is that the excluded evidence was relevant to rebut Mohawk’s [carpet manufacturer] point that the timing of Unibond’s [specific failed carpet brand at-issue] claims spike indicates that Arizona’s resin was the cause of the Unibond defects. The excluded evidence established that other products manufactured in the same Mohawk facility without Arizona’s resin experienced claims spikes at approximately the same time as Unibond. When these two points are considered outside the context of the remaining evidence, they make a compelling case for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Of course, context is key. When the trial court’s decision is viewed in the context in which Mohawk used the evidence of Unibond’s claims spike and the limitations of the evidence concerning other products’ claims spikes, the basis for the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion in this case is understandable.

***

Arizona argues that the evidence of other products’ claims spikes rebuts Mohawk’s causation theory because this evidence bears on the likelihood that other factors caused the Unibond claims spike. The specific factors Arizona suggests are poor quality control and lack of adherence to manufacturing protocol. However, there is no evidentiary basis in the record for supplying the connection between contemporaneous claims spikes of the four product lines and these factors. The record supports a theory that there may have been some general quality-control failings at the facility, but Arizona has not identified any evidence to substantiate its conclusion that problems with quality control explained the defects in the non-Unibond products. In fact, evidence Arizona submitted in opposition to Mohawk’s motion indicates that Mohawk traced the causes of the defects in the other products to design flaws and choices of raw materials, not quality-control or procedural failures.

Without a more direct connection between the other products’ failures and Unibond’s failures, the evidence of the other products’ failures showed causation, or rebutted Mohawk’s causation theory, only to the extent that it showed Mohawk has a propensity to produce bad carpet. Introducing evidence for this purpose is improper. In light of these considerations, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the other-product evidence as legally irrelevant to the issue of liability.

Arizona Chemical Company, LLC, supra (internal quotations omitted).

When relying on “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation theory, it is important to connect the dots and create the evidentiary link between the other products’ failures and the failure at-issue. In other words, you need to create the evidentiary link supporting an alternative theory of causation by relying on the “other products” evidence.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Motion for Directed Verdict (or to Set Aside the Verdict) is an Important Trial Consideration

Posted by David Adelstein on May 21, 2016
Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Motion for Directed Verdict (or to Set Aside the Verdict) is an Important Trial Consideration

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After the plaintiff puts on its case-in-chief, you, as the defendant, move for a directed verdict. (Check out this article too for more on directed verdicts.)  The court denies the motion for a directed verdict. You put on your defense and then the case is submitted to the jury. The jury returns a verdict in favor the plaintiff. You then move to set aside the verdict (also called a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The trial court denies your motion and enters final judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. You appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion for directed verdict / motion to set aside the verdict.

An appellate court must review a trial court’s determination on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo and “evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference flowing from the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor.” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Eghbal, 54 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Additionally, we must sustain a jury verdict if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Hancock v. Schorr, 941 So. 2d 409, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Frieri v. Capital Investment Services, Inc. , 41 Fla.L.Weekly D1189a (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).  

In other words, the appellate court will evaluate the evidence in favor of the non-moving plaintiff (part that did not move for the directed verdict) drawing reasonable inferences in its favor. If there was competent substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, the court will affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Now what if after the plaintiff puts on its case-in-chief, you, as the defendant, move for a directed verdict and the trial court grants the directed verdict in your favor and against the plaintiff.   The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s granting of your motion for directed verdict.

While the standard of review for the trial court’s entry of a directed verdict is de novo, an appellate court “can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.Banco Espirito Santo Int’l, Ltd. v. BDO Int’l, B.V., 979 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 329 (Fla. 2001)).

Frieri, supra.

In other words, the appellate court will evaluate the evidence to see if no proper view of the evidence, and all inferences drawn from the evidence, could support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence substantiating its claims (or a claim) against the defendant (i.e.,to sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff), then the appellate court will affirm the directed verdict.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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