abuse of discretion

Striking / Excusing a Prospective Juror for Bias during Voir Dire

Posted by David Adelstein on November 04, 2017
Appeal, Burden of Proof, Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Striking / Excusing a Prospective Juror for Bias during Voir Dire

An attorney’s opportunity to question prospective jurors (the jury venire) is an important part of the trial process. This is known as voir dire. Attorneys want to ask tailored questions to determine those persons in the venire that should be stricken for cause, those for which they should exercise a peremptory challenge, and those, quite frankly, they want to sit on the jury panel. There is strategy involved including wanting to develop a rapport with jurors. These are the potential folks that will render a verdict in the case and analyze the factual evidence based on the law (jury instructions). Having the opportunity to speak to them and ask them questions cannot be overlooked! Parties need a reasonable opportunity to ask prospective jurors questions during voir dire.

An important part of voir dire is to figure out biases of potential jurors. Obviously, if a juror cannot truly be impartial or fair based on their preconceived biases, then an attorney will want them stricken for cause. But in order to truly determine whether a juror has a bias that should render them stricken for cause, both sides need the reasonable opportunity to question the venire. Otherwise, the determination of a juror’s prejudicial bias will be one-sided based on one side’s questioning without any context from the questions the opposing side will ask.

In recent case, Irmi v. Estate of Dale Moyer, 42 Fla. L. Weekly, D2156b (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), dealing with wrongful death associated with cigarette smoking, the plaintiff’s counsel asked the venire whether they felt that if someone has been smoking essentially all of their life whether their family should not be allowed to file suit against the tobacco companies. Numerous jurors felt that the family should not be allowed to sue in this scenario. Such jurors were then asked whether this belief was strongly held and if they had a reasonable doubt whether they could set this feeling aside (establishing the bias of the jurors). The defense counsel wanted the opportunity to question such jurors in private to see if any of them could be rehabilitated (so they are not stricken for cause) but the court would not allow this. The defense counsel then wanted the opportunity to speak with the entire venire panel before the court struck jurors for cause based on their bias regarding long term cigarette smoking. The court denied this, over the defense counsel’s objection, and allowed approximately 30 jurors to leave without the defense ever questioning them.

After a jury verdict was entered for the plaintiff, the defendant moved for a new trial arguing that the court erroneously dismissed jurors for cause after the plaintiff’s questioning during voir dire without ever allowing the defense to question these jurors. The trial court recognized this error and granted a new trial because the court prevented the defense from its reasonable opportunity to question jurors about biases based on the plaintiff’s voir dire questioning. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s granting of a new trial.

When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s order granting a new trial, it is done under a limited abuse of discretion standard of review. “A trial court’s discretion to grant a new trial is of such firmness that it would not be disturbed except on a clear showing of abuse.” Irmi, supra, quoting Thigpen v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 990 So.2d 639, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Here, the trial court granted a new trial because it realized it excused jurors for cause based on bias without allowing the defense the opportunity to ever question these jurors. When a trial court is deciding whether to excuse a juror for bias, the test is whether the juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render a verdict in accordance with the evidence and not based upon preconceived opinions.” Irmi, supra (internal quotation and citation omitted). This means that each side – both the plaintiff and defense – must be given an opportunity to orally question jurors so that the entire context of the juror’s answers can be considered. “A trial court must excuse a juror where there is reasonable doubt whether the juror is impartial. To determine whether such reasonable doubt exists, the trial court should consider the context and entirety of the juror’s responses.” Irmi, supra (internal quotation and citation omitted).

In this situation: “The trial court had the unique perspective to reflect upon its own decision to eliminate thirty-one people from the venire without allowing the defense to ask a single question. We provide great deference to trial courts in making such decisions. We agree with the trial court in correcting its initial error and granting a new trial.” Irmi, supra.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Enforcing Non-Compete Agreement with Injunctive Relief

Posted by David Adelstein on March 19, 2017
Uncategorized / Comments Off on Enforcing Non-Compete Agreement with Injunctive Relief

There are numerous employers that want employees to sign a non-compete, non-disclosure, and non-solicitation agreement (collectively, the “non-compete agreement”).   For good reason, they don’t want to train employees to learn the business’ trade secrets and business practices (e.g., marking strategies, pricing, techniques, customer lists, etc.) only to then compete with the employer and solicit its clients.   The non-compete agreement will allow the employer to move for injunctive relief if a former employee violates the agreement to maintain the status quo and prevent the irreparable harm to the employer.

An example is as follows. In Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D631a (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), an employer that engaged in the manufacture and distribution of water treatment chemicals hired an employee. The company trained the employee regarding its practices and provided him with proprietary information such as production costs, customer lists, prospective customer lists, and marketing and pricing information. The employee’s non-compete agreement provided he would not compete with the employer for 18 months after leaving the company and within a 150-mile radius of any of the employer’s facilities. The employee left the company to work for a competitor and the employer moved for a preliminary injunction to enforce the non-compete agreement against the employee.

The trial court denied the employer’s motion for a preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing. The employer appealed. Because a trial court has discretion in granting or denying an injunction, its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. In this case, the appellate court reversed the trial court finding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the granting of the preliminary injunction.

Non-compete agreements in Florida will be governed by Florida Statute s. 542.335, which is designed to construe restraints on trade and commerce in favor of providing reasonable protection to legitimate business interests. The statute includes a non-exhaustive list of legitimate business interests, such as, trade secrets, valuable confidential information, customer goodwill, substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers, specialized training, etc.

A party moving for a preliminary injunction must establish:

  • “the likelihood of irreparable harm and the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law;
  • a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
  • that the threatened injury to the petitioner outweighs any possible harm to the respondent; and
  • that the granting of the temporary injunction will not disserve the public interest.”

Allied Universal Corp., supra.

Importantly, the “breach of a non-compete agreement that threatens a former employer’s goodwill and relationships with its customers, indicates that nothing short of an injunction would prevent this loss.” Allied Universal Corp., supra.

At the evidentiary hearing, the employer established legitimate business interests that it wanted to protect including the employer’s relationship with specific existing and prospective customers. The evidence showed that the employer trained the employee in its production techniques, marketing strategies, and pricing strategies.  Hence, the employer showed it would be irreparably harmed by the employee’s violation of the non-compete agreement—the employer’s business would be harmed if the employee were to use the employer’s customer information, relationships, and marketing strategy in his new employment. This meant that the burden shifted to the employee to establish the absence of an irreparable injury, which the employee was unable to do. For this reason, the appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded with directions for the trial court to grant the temporary injunction.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Quick Note: So You Want to Appeal an Injunction Entered Against You…

Posted by David Adelstein on January 17, 2017
Appeal / Comments Off on Quick Note: So You Want to Appeal an Injunction Entered Against You…

So you want to appeal the issuance of an injunction entered against you. (There are numerous reasons why injunctive relief may be entered by the court in a civil context – check out this article as an example.) “If the injunction rests on factual findings, then a trial court’s order must be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion; but if the injunction rests on purely legal matters, then an injunction is reviewed de novo.” Nipper v. Walton County, Florida, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D171a (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Stated differently, there is an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review if the injunction is based on factual findings by the trial court. But, assuming the facts are not in dispute and the injunction is based on a matter of law, there is a de novo standard of appellate review.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Improperly Admitting Hearsay can still be Harmless Error

Posted by David Adelstein on September 03, 2016
Evidence / Comments Off on Improperly Admitting Hearsay can still be Harmless Error

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I have discussed the hearsay rule (the evidentiary exclusionary rule and the numerous exceptions) ad nauseam and will continue to do so because it is such an important aspect of a civil trial. There will invariably be an objection under the hearsay rule during trial. The trial court will either sustain the objection or overrule the objection, perhaps under an exception to the hearsay rule.

What if a trial court makes a mistake—it happens—and overrules a hearsay objection and admits hearsay evidence? As previously mentioned, an appellate court will review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard of review, limited by Florida’s rules of evidence.

In Johnson v. State, 2016 WL 446889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)—yes, a criminal case—a defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling a hearsay objection and admitting hearsay evidence / testimony. During the trial, the defendant objected when the responding police officer was asked to testify how the victim and the victim’s friend described the defendant. The trial court overruled this objection and the officer was allowed to testify. The appellate court correctly found that this testimony was hearsay as it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted–that the defendant was involved in the crime. There was not a hearsay exception that would otherwise allow the officer to recount the victim and the victim’s friend’s description of the defendant.

Unfortunately for the defendant, the trial court’s error was harmless. So, yes, the trial court erred by allowing the officer to offer hearsay testimony, but the error was deemed harmless error. If the error is harmless, then the appellate court will affirm the trial court. Remember, just because a trial court commits error during the course of the trial does not mean the error will result in a new trial or a reversal.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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“Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

Posted by David Adelstein on May 30, 2016
Appeal, Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on “Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

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The recent case of Arizona Chemical Company, LLC v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1213a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) is a case I discussed regarding lost profit damages. Check out that article here. But, this case also raised an interesting trial and appellate issue involving “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation argument, such as when a specific product or manufactured component fails.

This case involved a manufacturer of a specific brand of carpet suing the manufacturer of resin that was used in manufacturing the failed carpet brand. The carpet manufacturer claimed that the resin failure caused an increase in warranty claims and consumer complaints.

Applicable here is the carpet manufacturer’s pre-trial motion in limine to prevent the resin manufacturer from introducing evidence about other brands manufactured by the carpet manufacturer (that did not use the resin) that contemporaneously failed and also resulted in spikes in consumer claims. In particular, the resin manufacturer intended to introduce evidence at trial of consumer claim spikes related to three other brands of carpet manufactured by the carpet manufacturer, although none of the other brands used the resin. The resin manufacturer claimed that such contemporaneous failures indicate that something other than the resin caused the failure in all of the brands. An alternate causation argument. Makes sense, right? The trial court, however, granted the carpet manufacturer’s motion in limine since the other products were dissimilar to the failed carpet brand at-issue (as none of the other brands used the resin) precluding this “other products” evidence from being introduced during trial.

Post-trial, the resin manufacturer appealed, among other issues, the trial court’s granting of the motion in limine. The First District held that the relevance of “other products” evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. In reviewing this issue under this abuse of discretion standard of review, the First District affirmed the trial court’s preclusion of this “other products” evidence finding that such evidence was NOT relevant:

 

Generally, evidence of “possible explanations” for the plaintiff’s harm other than the defendant’s negligence is relevant and must be admitted. To establish the relevance of particular alternative-causation evidence, however, the defendant must provide a competent evidentiary link between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s theory. This threshold requirement exists as a function of the relevance rule, even though the defendant does not carry a quantifiable burden of proof as to the alternative explanation.

Here, Arizona’s [resin manufactuer] basic argument is that the excluded evidence was relevant to rebut Mohawk’s [carpet manufacturer] point that the timing of Unibond’s [specific failed carpet brand at-issue] claims spike indicates that Arizona’s resin was the cause of the Unibond defects. The excluded evidence established that other products manufactured in the same Mohawk facility without Arizona’s resin experienced claims spikes at approximately the same time as Unibond. When these two points are considered outside the context of the remaining evidence, they make a compelling case for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Of course, context is key. When the trial court’s decision is viewed in the context in which Mohawk used the evidence of Unibond’s claims spike and the limitations of the evidence concerning other products’ claims spikes, the basis for the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion in this case is understandable.

***

Arizona argues that the evidence of other products’ claims spikes rebuts Mohawk’s causation theory because this evidence bears on the likelihood that other factors caused the Unibond claims spike. The specific factors Arizona suggests are poor quality control and lack of adherence to manufacturing protocol. However, there is no evidentiary basis in the record for supplying the connection between contemporaneous claims spikes of the four product lines and these factors. The record supports a theory that there may have been some general quality-control failings at the facility, but Arizona has not identified any evidence to substantiate its conclusion that problems with quality control explained the defects in the non-Unibond products. In fact, evidence Arizona submitted in opposition to Mohawk’s motion indicates that Mohawk traced the causes of the defects in the other products to design flaws and choices of raw materials, not quality-control or procedural failures.

Without a more direct connection between the other products’ failures and Unibond’s failures, the evidence of the other products’ failures showed causation, or rebutted Mohawk’s causation theory, only to the extent that it showed Mohawk has a propensity to produce bad carpet. Introducing evidence for this purpose is improper. In light of these considerations, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the other-product evidence as legally irrelevant to the issue of liability.

Arizona Chemical Company, LLC, supra (internal quotations omitted).

When relying on “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation theory, it is important to connect the dots and create the evidentiary link between the other products’ failures and the failure at-issue. In other words, you need to create the evidentiary link supporting an alternative theory of causation by relying on the “other products” evidence.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Prejudicial Closing Argument Could Result in Mistrial / New Trial

Posted by David Adelstein on March 27, 2016
Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Prejudicial Closing Argument Could Result in Mistrial / New Trial

 

Closing argument is a very, very important part of jury trials to sum up the evidence in the context / theme of your case based on the applicable law. It is your last opportunity to talk directly to the jury about the theme of your case. Check out this article for the purpose of closing argument.

While lawyers are afforded latitude in presenting closing argument, improper and prejudicial argument could result in an appellate court granting a new trial. The opposing party must, however, timely object to the improper and prejudicial argument in order to properly preserve this objection for appeal. This is typically done at the time of the prejudicial argument with the opposing counsel moving the trial judge to declare a mistrial. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gafney, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D744b (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006) (“If the issue of an opponent’s improper argument has been properly preserved by objection and motion for mistrial, the trial court should grant a new trial if the argument was ‘so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the opposing party its right to a fair trial.”). The standard of review on appeal for a motion for a mistrial or new trial based on improper closing is an abuse of discretion standard of review. Gafney, supra.

In Gafney, a wrongful death case against tobacco manufacturers, the plaintiff’s lawyers made improper comments to the jury asking the jury to “send a message” to the tobacco companies through their compensatory damage award in the verdict. The plaintiff’s lawyers also insinuated in closing argument that the defendant’s lawyers were involved in a conspiracy to cover-up the addictive nature of smoking cigarettes.

“Sending a Message” Closing Argument

 

The Fourth District held that “sending a message” argument is inappropriate when asking the jury to send a message with respect to compensatory damages (since this is the purpose of punitive damages and not compensatory damages):

 

“Send a message” arguments have been defined as those that ask a jury to “award money not based on the proof supporting the proper recoverable damages allowed in a wrongful death action, but to remedy wrongful, intentional, as opposed to negligent, conduct,” and those that “suggest[ ] to the jury that a significant verdict will send a message to stop [such] experiences from happening and will make others less likely to act irresponsibly.” The overwhelming weight of Florida jurisprudence informs us that “send a message” arguments are clearly inappropriate when utilized in a way that links the “sending of the message” to a compensatory damage award, and not to the entitlement to, or amount of, punitive damages.

***

Exhorting a jury with a “call to action” to use its verdict to “speak loud and speak clear” via a compensatory damage award, as was done repeatedly here, is improper. … However, today we clarify that even when both claims are at issue, a plaintiff may not utilize “send a message” and conscience of the community arguments when discussing whether the plaintiff should be compensated, due to the potential for the jury to punish through the compensatory award. Appellee’s counsel’s comments in this case served only to divert the jurors’ attention from the proper consideration.

Gafney, supra (internal citation omitted).

Ad Hominem Attack on Opposing Counsel

 

The Fourth District also held that closing argument that insinuated that defendant’s counsel was involved in a conspiracy was inappropriate. Closing argument is not intended to attack an opposing counsel for being part of an improper scheme:

There is no question that appellee’s counsel went outside the broad parameters of permissible closing argument when he turned his commentary on opposing counsel. These statements were totally irrelevant to the issue of appellants’ liability. The insinuation that appellants’ attorneys were engaged in a conspiracy with either the defendants or third parties to mislead, conceal, or manipulate as part of an on-going scheme did not merely push the envelope, but instead went wholly beyond the pale.

***

Accusations of wrongdoing by opposing counsel, such as those made in this case, would likely be improper even if made solely to a judge. Here, the comments achieved no other purpose than to discredit appellants’ attorneys in the eyes of the jury, planting in the juror’s minds the thought that the attorneys themselves were engaged in nefarious behind-the-scenes acts….

Gafney, supra.

In another example, you can check out this article for improper closing argument leading to a new trial in a trial against an insurance company.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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You Cannot Contradict Testimony with Affidavit Testimony in Response to Summary Judgment

Posted by David Adelstein on January 29, 2016
Appeal, Expert Testimony / Comments Off on You Cannot Contradict Testimony with Affidavit Testimony in Response to Summary Judgment

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Preparing expert witnesses for deposition is vital. To this end, working with an expert witness to ensure their expert opinions fit within the context and theme of your case and burden of proof is equally vital. Not doing so can be fatal to your case. This can lead to unprepared testimony or opinions that may appear innocuous but are in fact detrimental to your claims.

For example, in the recent opinion in Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D281a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the plaintiff’s expert witness was deposed. The case involved a single vehicle accident where the plaintiff asserted claims against the dealership he purchased his used vehicle from. During deposition, the expert was asked specific questions and answered that he had no expert opinions as to those questions/issues. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In response to the motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of his expert. The problem, however, was that the expert rendered opinions in the affidavit that contradicted with his deposition testimony. In other words, he rendered opinions in the affidavit as to issues he previously testified that he had no expert opinions on. The trial court struck the affidavit based on the law that “a litigant when confronted with an adverse motion for summary judgment, may not contradict or disavow prior sworn testimony with contradictory sworn affidavit testimony.” Lesnik, supra, quoting Ondo v. F. Gary Gieseke, P.A., 697 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The appellate court affirmed (explaining that reviewing trial court’s order striking the expert’s affidavit was an abuse of discretion standard of review and the trial court acted within its discretion).

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence Reviewed Under Abuse of Discretion

Posted by David Adelstein on October 06, 2015
Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence Reviewed Under Abuse of Discretion

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The trial court allowed certain testimony / evidence to be introduced at trial.  I objected, but the trial court overruled my objection. That evidence was introduced and I lost the trial.  I am considering an appeal based on the trial court’s admissibility of this evidence.

“Rulings on the admission of evidence are reviewed [on appeal] under the abuse of discretion standard [of review].”  Cantore ex rel. Cantore v. West Boca Medical Center, Inc., 2015 WL 5603449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).  This discretion, however, is limited by the Florida Rules of Evidence.   Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla. 2003). 

For example, in Cantore, a medical malpractice action, a pediatric neurosurgeon that treated a minor answered hypothetical questions.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant hospital and the plaintiff appealed.   The plaintiff argued that the the trial court should not have admitted the testimony of the treating doctor in answering hypothetical questions.   The appellate court, in the context of the medical malpractice action, found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Purpose of Closing Argument

Posted by David Adelstein on May 28, 2015
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Purpose of Closing Argument

We talked about the purpose of opening statements. Now, let’s talk about the purpose of closing argument.

One of my favorite all-time shows is Law and Order. Jack McCoy can certainly deliver a closing argument like no other where the purpose of his closing argument always seems abundantly clear. 

The purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the evidence presented to the law. See Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000).   It serves as the final opportunity for the lawyer to fully connect his/her client’s theme of the case (possibly explained during opening) based on the evidence presented at trial and the applicable law. See id. at 1028 (“Attorneys should be afforded great latitude in presenting closing argument, but they must confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.”) (internal quotation omitted); Jean v. State, 27 So.3d 784, 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“Counsel should be permitted to present all legitimate argument [during closing]. In doing so, the trial court must afford counsel wide latitude in presenting the closing argument.”) (internal citations omitted).

The value of closing argument cannot be overstated. It allows the lawyer to summarize the evidence in the client’s favor while persuasively serving as an advocate for the client.

After the jury is selected and sworn, the judge should read a preliminary jury instruction (per Section 202.2 of Florida’s Standard Civil Jury Instructions) that explains when a lawyer will give a closing argument:

Instructions Before Closing Arguments: After all the evidence has been presented to you, I will instruct you in the law that you must follow. It is important that you remember these instructions to assist you in evaluating the final attorney presentations, which come next, and, later, during your deliberations, to help you correctly sort through the evidence to reach your decision.
Closing Arguments: The attorneys will then have the opportunity to make their final presentations to you, which are called closing arguments.

There are, of course, things a lawyer should not do during closing argument such as personally vouch for the credibility of a witness or inject personal beliefs into the case. But there are indirect ways for a lawyer to go into the credibility of a witness or his/her theory of the case by focusing on that evidence supporting the theory and tying that evidence to applicable law.

If a party believes that the opposing party is giving an improper closing argument, it is imperative that they object. But, if they don’t object during closing argument, they must at least move for a new trial arguing that the opposing party’s argument constituted harmful or reversible error—that the unobjected to closing contained argument that is highly prejudicial and impaired fair consideration by the jury. See Murphy, 766 So.2d 1010 (explaining, however, that it is not improper to identify a witness as a liar or that he/she lied if supported by the evidence). Additionally, the party must establish that the unobjected to improper closing argument was incurable by a jury instruction (had it been timely objected to). See id. And, finally, the party must establish that the unobjected to, improper, harmful, and incurable closing argument damaged the fairness of the trial such that the public’s interest in the jury system requires a new trial. See id. Yes, this is a very difficult hurdle further supporting the importance of timely objecting to improper closing argument.

On the other hand, if a trial court gratuitously restricts an opposing party’s closing argument, such restriction could amount to an abuse of discretion. “[A]” trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to afford such latitude to defense [and plaintiff’s] counsel and, as a result, counsel is precluded from presenting his or her theory of the case to the jury.” See Jean, 27 So.3d at 786.

Ok, let’s get back to some more Jack McCoy:

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Purpose of a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence

Posted by David Adelstein on April 16, 2015
Appeal, Evidence / Comments Off on Purpose of a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence

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In order to avoid prejudicial or irrelevant evidence from being introduced to the jury by the adverse party, a party will file a motion in limine to exclude this evidence. “Generally, the purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent the introduction of improper evidence, the mere mention of which at trial would be prejudicial.” Buy-Low Save Centers, Inc. v. Glinert, 547 So.2d 1283, 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Stated differently: “The purpose of a motion in limine is to exclude irrelevant and immaterial matters, or to exclude evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Devoe v. Western Auto Supply Co., 537 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (internal citation omitted).

There are times the basis of an appeal stems from the trial court granting or denying a motion in limine. If a trial court grants a motion in limine, this means the trial court is excluding evidence a party otherwise wants to introduce. If a trial court denies a motion in limine, this means the trial court is allowing evidence to be introduced that an adverse party contends is irrelevant or prejudicial. “The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is abuse of discretion.” Aarmada Protection Systems 2000, Inc. v. Yandell, 73 So.3d 893, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

If a party violates a court’s order granting a motion in limine, the court could declare a mistrial and order a new trial. See Azriel v. La Marca, 722 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Fischman, M.D. v. Suen, M.D., 672 So.2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). For instance, if a trial court grants a motion in limine and excludes certain evidence or testimony, and the adverse party disregards the court’s order and introduces that evidence or testimony, the court could declare a mistrial and order a new trial upon the jury returning a verdict in favor of the adverse party.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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