standard of review

Appealing Trial Court’s Interpretation of Contract

Posted by David Adelstein on July 24, 2016
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Appealing Trial Court’s Interpretation of Contract

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Many disputes turn on the interpretation of a contract, contractual term, or written document. When the trial court rules on the interpretation, there will typically be a party that disagrees with the court’s interpretation. In these instances, this party will appeal the trial court’s interpretation. There is a value to appeal because the appellate standard of review is de novo meaning the appellate court will review the trial court’s record anew without giving deference to the trial court’s interpretation.

The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law and the appellate court construes the contract under a de novo standard of review. Notably, construction of contractual terms is a question of law, which we review de novo, provided that the language is clear and unambiguous and free of conflicting inferences.

Ciklin Lubetz Martens & O’Connell v. Patrick J. Casey, P.A., 41 Fla.L.Weekly D1678b (Fla. 4th DCA 2016 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

For example, in a dispute concerning a law firm’s partnership agreement as it pertains to the withdrawal of a partner, the trial court made an interpretation of the partnership agreement that resulted in certain amounts being awarded to the withdrawing partner. The law firm appealed the trial court’s interpretation and the appellate court, examining the partnership agreement under a de novo standard of appellate review, reversed certain interpretations by the trial court. This is because the appellate court was able to examine the partnership agreement anew without providing any deference to how the trial court interpreted the partnership agreement.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Challenging Standard for Granting Directed Verdict

Posted by David Adelstein on June 25, 2016
Evidence, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Challenging Standard for Granting Directed Verdict

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If there is a jury trial, there will be a motion for directed verdict. But, the standard for granting a motion for directed verdict is challenging; if the directed verdict is granted, an appeal will be filed arguing the trial court’s error in granting the directed verdict.

James v. City of Tampa, 2016 WL 3201221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) was a personal injury action. The issue at trial was whether the plaintiff’s injuries from a car accident constituted a permanent injury (as this issue impacted damages to be awarded to the injured plaintiff). At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered a permanent injury, meaning the directed verdict prevented the jury from considering whether the injuries were permanent, and if so, damages associated with the permanent injuries. Naturally, the plaintiff appealed.

Regarding the challenging burden in granting a motion for directed verdict:

A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of the evidence, or inferenced made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmoving party. In considering a motion for directed verdict, the court must evaluate the testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and every reasonable inference deduced from the evidence must be indulged in favor of the nonmoving party. In there are conflicts in the evidence or different or reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury. The standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion for directed verdict is the same test used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.

James, supra, quoting Sims v. Cristinzio, 898 So.2d 1004, 1005-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Here, the appellate court had no choice but to reverse the directed verdict remanding the matter back to the trial court for a new trial as to damages. The plaintiff put on expert testimony regarding the issue of permanent damages and the defendant cross-examined the plaintiff and presented its own rebutting expert. Thus, the issue of permanency was really a question for the jury as the directed verdict would only be appropriate where “the evidence of injury and causation is such that no reasonable inference could support a jury verdict for the plaintiff…on the permanency issue.” James, supra.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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“Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

Posted by David Adelstein on May 30, 2016
Appeal, Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on “Other Products” Evidence to Support Alternate Causation Theory

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The recent case of Arizona Chemical Company, LLC v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1213a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) is a case I discussed regarding lost profit damages. Check out that article here. But, this case also raised an interesting trial and appellate issue involving “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation argument, such as when a specific product or manufactured component fails.

This case involved a manufacturer of a specific brand of carpet suing the manufacturer of resin that was used in manufacturing the failed carpet brand. The carpet manufacturer claimed that the resin failure caused an increase in warranty claims and consumer complaints.

Applicable here is the carpet manufacturer’s pre-trial motion in limine to prevent the resin manufacturer from introducing evidence about other brands manufactured by the carpet manufacturer (that did not use the resin) that contemporaneously failed and also resulted in spikes in consumer claims. In particular, the resin manufacturer intended to introduce evidence at trial of consumer claim spikes related to three other brands of carpet manufactured by the carpet manufacturer, although none of the other brands used the resin. The resin manufacturer claimed that such contemporaneous failures indicate that something other than the resin caused the failure in all of the brands. An alternate causation argument. Makes sense, right? The trial court, however, granted the carpet manufacturer’s motion in limine since the other products were dissimilar to the failed carpet brand at-issue (as none of the other brands used the resin) precluding this “other products” evidence from being introduced during trial.

Post-trial, the resin manufacturer appealed, among other issues, the trial court’s granting of the motion in limine. The First District held that the relevance of “other products” evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. In reviewing this issue under this abuse of discretion standard of review, the First District affirmed the trial court’s preclusion of this “other products” evidence finding that such evidence was NOT relevant:

 

Generally, evidence of “possible explanations” for the plaintiff’s harm other than the defendant’s negligence is relevant and must be admitted. To establish the relevance of particular alternative-causation evidence, however, the defendant must provide a competent evidentiary link between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s theory. This threshold requirement exists as a function of the relevance rule, even though the defendant does not carry a quantifiable burden of proof as to the alternative explanation.

Here, Arizona’s [resin manufactuer] basic argument is that the excluded evidence was relevant to rebut Mohawk’s [carpet manufacturer] point that the timing of Unibond’s [specific failed carpet brand at-issue] claims spike indicates that Arizona’s resin was the cause of the Unibond defects. The excluded evidence established that other products manufactured in the same Mohawk facility without Arizona’s resin experienced claims spikes at approximately the same time as Unibond. When these two points are considered outside the context of the remaining evidence, they make a compelling case for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Of course, context is key. When the trial court’s decision is viewed in the context in which Mohawk used the evidence of Unibond’s claims spike and the limitations of the evidence concerning other products’ claims spikes, the basis for the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion in this case is understandable.

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Arizona argues that the evidence of other products’ claims spikes rebuts Mohawk’s causation theory because this evidence bears on the likelihood that other factors caused the Unibond claims spike. The specific factors Arizona suggests are poor quality control and lack of adherence to manufacturing protocol. However, there is no evidentiary basis in the record for supplying the connection between contemporaneous claims spikes of the four product lines and these factors. The record supports a theory that there may have been some general quality-control failings at the facility, but Arizona has not identified any evidence to substantiate its conclusion that problems with quality control explained the defects in the non-Unibond products. In fact, evidence Arizona submitted in opposition to Mohawk’s motion indicates that Mohawk traced the causes of the defects in the other products to design flaws and choices of raw materials, not quality-control or procedural failures.

Without a more direct connection between the other products’ failures and Unibond’s failures, the evidence of the other products’ failures showed causation, or rebutted Mohawk’s causation theory, only to the extent that it showed Mohawk has a propensity to produce bad carpet. Introducing evidence for this purpose is improper. In light of these considerations, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the other-product evidence as legally irrelevant to the issue of liability.

Arizona Chemical Company, LLC, supra (internal quotations omitted).

When relying on “other products” evidence to support an alternate causation theory, it is important to connect the dots and create the evidentiary link between the other products’ failures and the failure at-issue. In other words, you need to create the evidentiary link supporting an alternative theory of causation by relying on the “other products” evidence.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Motion for Directed Verdict (or to Set Aside the Verdict) is an Important Trial Consideration

Posted by David Adelstein on May 21, 2016
Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Motion for Directed Verdict (or to Set Aside the Verdict) is an Important Trial Consideration

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After the plaintiff puts on its case-in-chief, you, as the defendant, move for a directed verdict. (Check out this article too for more on directed verdicts.)  The court denies the motion for a directed verdict. You put on your defense and then the case is submitted to the jury. The jury returns a verdict in favor the plaintiff. You then move to set aside the verdict (also called a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The trial court denies your motion and enters final judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. You appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion for directed verdict / motion to set aside the verdict.

An appellate court must review a trial court’s determination on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo and “evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference flowing from the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor.” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Eghbal, 54 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Additionally, we must sustain a jury verdict if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Hancock v. Schorr, 941 So. 2d 409, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Frieri v. Capital Investment Services, Inc. , 41 Fla.L.Weekly D1189a (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).  

In other words, the appellate court will evaluate the evidence in favor of the non-moving plaintiff (part that did not move for the directed verdict) drawing reasonable inferences in its favor. If there was competent substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, the court will affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Now what if after the plaintiff puts on its case-in-chief, you, as the defendant, move for a directed verdict and the trial court grants the directed verdict in your favor and against the plaintiff.   The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s granting of your motion for directed verdict.

While the standard of review for the trial court’s entry of a directed verdict is de novo, an appellate court “can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.Banco Espirito Santo Int’l, Ltd. v. BDO Int’l, B.V., 979 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 329 (Fla. 2001)).

Frieri, supra.

In other words, the appellate court will evaluate the evidence to see if no proper view of the evidence, and all inferences drawn from the evidence, could support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence substantiating its claims (or a claim) against the defendant (i.e.,to sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff), then the appellate court will affirm the directed verdict.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Difference Between Lay Opinion Testimony and Expert Opinion Testimony

Posted by David Adelstein on April 07, 2016
Appeal, Evidence, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Difference Between Lay Opinion Testimony and Expert Opinion Testimony

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Although I have numerous blog articles regarding the appellate standard of review when it comes to the admissibility of evidence, it is important to remember that “[a] trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; however, the trial court’s interpretation of the evidence code is reviewed de novo.” L.L. v. The State of Florida, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D854a (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

In L.L., a criminal case, a police officer testified that he smelled the strong odor of marijuana from the defendant and that a plastic bag in defendant’s possession contained marijuana. The defendant objected that the officer’s opinions about the smell being marijuana and the substance in the bag being marijuana was an improper lay opinion and constituted expert opinion testimony (governed by the Daubert standard). The trial court allowed this testimony and the issue on appeal was whether such testimony was expert opinion testimony or proper lay opinion (fact witness) testimony.

The appellate court held that the officer’s testimony or opinions about the smell and substance being marijuana was proper lay witness opinion testimony governed under Florida Evidence Code 90.701:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the [lay] witness’s testimony about what he or she perceived may be in the form of inference and opinion when:

(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness’s use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and

(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.

The appellate court’s holding included a very good discussion explaining in detail why the officer’s opinion was proper lay opinion testimony as opposed to expert opinion testimony governed by the Daubert standard:

In addition to the requirement that lay opinion testimony be based on the personal knowledge and perception of the witness, the Advisory Committee Notes explain that courts should consider the witness’s method of reasoning: “the distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.‘ ” …As one scholar has explained:

[T]he distinction lies in whether the witness’s reasoning process entails a reliable methodology beyond everyday reasoning. A lay witness, however experienced, offers no methodology beyond ordinary reasoning. An expert is equipped to draw more sophisticated, yet still reliable, inferences. The crux of expert testimony is that it presents inferences that are supported through the application of a reliable methodology. Thus, the witness who relies on experience to support an expert opinion cannot simply claim insights arrived at by applying everyday reasoning to that experience base, but must explain the methodology employed to reach that opinion. An experienced witness who does not bring such methodology to bear should be subject to the restrictions of the lay opinion rule.

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One important reason the Daubert standard [governing the admissibility of expert witness opinions] imposes a more demanding reliability inquiry upon expert opinion testimony is that the opinion results from a methodology or reasoning process that might be foreign to the trier of fact….But in cases such as the one now before us, even if the trier of fact does not have the personal experience necessary to identify the substance in question, the reasoning process is not “foreign in kind.” Many people who have seen and smelled marijuana would be able to recognize it in the same way they recognize anything else they have seen or smelled before.

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Here, Officer Munecas’s reasoning process is nothing that requires a specialist in the field of drug identification; it is reasoning familiar in everyday life.

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Finally, we hasten to add that although the more demanding Daubert admissibility standard does not apply to lay opinion testimony, there is nevertheless a reliability inquiry. Not only must lay opinion testimony be based on the witness’s personal knowledge, section 90.604, Florida Statutes, and perceptions, section 90.701, Florida Statutes, but the witness must have sufficient personal knowledge to support the opinion.

L.L., supra (internal citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Prejudicial Closing Argument Could Result in Mistrial / New Trial

Posted by David Adelstein on March 27, 2016
Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Prejudicial Closing Argument Could Result in Mistrial / New Trial

 

Closing argument is a very, very important part of jury trials to sum up the evidence in the context / theme of your case based on the applicable law. It is your last opportunity to talk directly to the jury about the theme of your case. Check out this article for the purpose of closing argument.

While lawyers are afforded latitude in presenting closing argument, improper and prejudicial argument could result in an appellate court granting a new trial. The opposing party must, however, timely object to the improper and prejudicial argument in order to properly preserve this objection for appeal. This is typically done at the time of the prejudicial argument with the opposing counsel moving the trial judge to declare a mistrial. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gafney, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D744b (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006) (“If the issue of an opponent’s improper argument has been properly preserved by objection and motion for mistrial, the trial court should grant a new trial if the argument was ‘so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the opposing party its right to a fair trial.”). The standard of review on appeal for a motion for a mistrial or new trial based on improper closing is an abuse of discretion standard of review. Gafney, supra.

In Gafney, a wrongful death case against tobacco manufacturers, the plaintiff’s lawyers made improper comments to the jury asking the jury to “send a message” to the tobacco companies through their compensatory damage award in the verdict. The plaintiff’s lawyers also insinuated in closing argument that the defendant’s lawyers were involved in a conspiracy to cover-up the addictive nature of smoking cigarettes.

“Sending a Message” Closing Argument

 

The Fourth District held that “sending a message” argument is inappropriate when asking the jury to send a message with respect to compensatory damages (since this is the purpose of punitive damages and not compensatory damages):

 

“Send a message” arguments have been defined as those that ask a jury to “award money not based on the proof supporting the proper recoverable damages allowed in a wrongful death action, but to remedy wrongful, intentional, as opposed to negligent, conduct,” and those that “suggest[ ] to the jury that a significant verdict will send a message to stop [such] experiences from happening and will make others less likely to act irresponsibly.” The overwhelming weight of Florida jurisprudence informs us that “send a message” arguments are clearly inappropriate when utilized in a way that links the “sending of the message” to a compensatory damage award, and not to the entitlement to, or amount of, punitive damages.

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Exhorting a jury with a “call to action” to use its verdict to “speak loud and speak clear” via a compensatory damage award, as was done repeatedly here, is improper. … However, today we clarify that even when both claims are at issue, a plaintiff may not utilize “send a message” and conscience of the community arguments when discussing whether the plaintiff should be compensated, due to the potential for the jury to punish through the compensatory award. Appellee’s counsel’s comments in this case served only to divert the jurors’ attention from the proper consideration.

Gafney, supra (internal citation omitted).

Ad Hominem Attack on Opposing Counsel

 

The Fourth District also held that closing argument that insinuated that defendant’s counsel was involved in a conspiracy was inappropriate. Closing argument is not intended to attack an opposing counsel for being part of an improper scheme:

There is no question that appellee’s counsel went outside the broad parameters of permissible closing argument when he turned his commentary on opposing counsel. These statements were totally irrelevant to the issue of appellants’ liability. The insinuation that appellants’ attorneys were engaged in a conspiracy with either the defendants or third parties to mislead, conceal, or manipulate as part of an on-going scheme did not merely push the envelope, but instead went wholly beyond the pale.

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Accusations of wrongdoing by opposing counsel, such as those made in this case, would likely be improper even if made solely to a judge. Here, the comments achieved no other purpose than to discredit appellants’ attorneys in the eyes of the jury, planting in the juror’s minds the thought that the attorneys themselves were engaged in nefarious behind-the-scenes acts….

Gafney, supra.

In another example, you can check out this article for improper closing argument leading to a new trial in a trial against an insurance company.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Witness Laying Foundation for Business Records Exception Need Not be the Person that Prepared the Business Records

Posted by David Adelstein on February 16, 2016
Appeal, Evidence / Comments Off on Witness Laying Foundation for Business Records Exception Need Not be the Person that Prepared the Business Records

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If you have visited this blog before, then you know the importance I place on the business records exception to the hearsay rule in civil business disputes. (Check out this article too.) Lately, the business records exception to the hearsay rule is a hot topic in mortgage foreclosure cases.

In yet another foreclosure case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee, on Behalf of the Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust Mortgage Loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 v. Balkisson, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D308a (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), the trial court entered an involuntary dismissal in favor of the borrower and against the lender after sustaining the borrower’s objection to hearsay based on the lender not properly laying the foundation for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. (An involuntary dismissal is essentially the same thing as a directed verdict in a non-jury bench trial. Similar to a directed verdict, the standard of appellate review for a motion for involuntary dismissal is de novo. See Wells Fargo Bank, supra.) The trial court sustained the hearsay objection because the loan servicer’s records custodian witness was unable to describe the specialized computer programs utilized to generate the payment history and default notice. The trial court’s ruling in sustaining the objection precluded the lender from presenting the payment history and the default notice into evidence meaning the lender could not prove its case at trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.

The Fourth District explained that a testifying witness establishing the business records exception to the hearsay rule “need not be the person who actually prepared the business records. Instead, the witness just need be well enough acquainted with the [record keeping] activity to provide testimony.” Wells Fargo Bank, supra (internal quotations and citation omitted).

While the witness was not familiar with how data was entered into the computer system, there is no requirement that the witness have such knowledge to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The witness was sufficiently familiar with the loan servicer’s practices and procedures in generating the payment history and notice of default to lay the foundation for the business records exception.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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De Novo Standard of Appellate Review for Construction of Arbitration Provision

Posted by David Adelstein on February 10, 2016
Standard of Review / Comments Off on De Novo Standard of Appellate Review for Construction of Arbitration Provision

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Your contract contains an arbitration provision meaning you are required to arbitrate your dispute instead of litigate your dispute (in court).  Nonetheless, your opponent files a lawsuit against you and you move to compel the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in your contract.  But, the trial court denies your motion to compel arbitration based on its interpretation of the arbitration provision. So, what do you do? You file an interlocutory appeal to appeal this ruling since you want to arbitrate your dispute.  The appellate standard of review for the construction (interpretation) of an arbitration provision is de novo.  See MuniCommerce, LLC v. Navidor, Ltd., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D317b (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing trial court’s order compelling arbitration based on its construction of arbitration provision).  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Statutory Construction Subject to De Novo Standard of Appellate Review

Posted by David Adelstein on February 07, 2016
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Statutory Construction Subject to De Novo Standard of Appellate Review

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Oftentimes, courts are required to engage in statutory construction and this statutory construction becomes a driving issue in the dispute. Statutory construction is the process of a court interpreting law and then applying that law to a set of facts. For example, if your case turns on the interpretation of a particular Florida statute applied to your facts, this would be statutory construction. 

On appeal, the issue of statutory construction is subject to a de novo standard of appellate review. Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. Ecos, 163 So.3d 1286, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). A de novo standard of review means the appellate court is going to review the trial court’s record anew without giving deference to the trial court.

I discussed the facts in Taylor Morrison Services here. The issue on appeal was whether a homebuilder (contractor) was unlicensed at the time of contract with the homeowners (per Florida Statutes Chapter 489). The trial court declared that the homebuilder was unlicensed by interpreting Florida’s licensing law and applying that law to the facts before it. In reviewing this issue on appeal (and ultimately reversing the trial court’s statutory construction), the First District stated:

The correctness of the trial court’s order turns on an issue of statutory construction, which is subject to de novo review. Proper statutory analysis begins with the plain language of the statute, which is to be considered in context, and not construed in a way that renders any portion of the statute meaningless. When the [statutory] language is unclear or ambiguous, it is appropriate to apply established principles of interpretation to discern the meaning of the governing text.

Taylor Morrison Services, 163 So.3d at 1289 (internal citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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You Cannot Contradict Testimony with Affidavit Testimony in Response to Summary Judgment

Posted by David Adelstein on January 29, 2016
Appeal, Expert Testimony / Comments Off on You Cannot Contradict Testimony with Affidavit Testimony in Response to Summary Judgment

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Preparing expert witnesses for deposition is vital. To this end, working with an expert witness to ensure their expert opinions fit within the context and theme of your case and burden of proof is equally vital. Not doing so can be fatal to your case. This can lead to unprepared testimony or opinions that may appear innocuous but are in fact detrimental to your claims.

For example, in the recent opinion in Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D281a (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the plaintiff’s expert witness was deposed. The case involved a single vehicle accident where the plaintiff asserted claims against the dealership he purchased his used vehicle from. During deposition, the expert was asked specific questions and answered that he had no expert opinions as to those questions/issues. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In response to the motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of his expert. The problem, however, was that the expert rendered opinions in the affidavit that contradicted with his deposition testimony. In other words, he rendered opinions in the affidavit as to issues he previously testified that he had no expert opinions on. The trial court struck the affidavit based on the law that “a litigant when confronted with an adverse motion for summary judgment, may not contradict or disavow prior sworn testimony with contradictory sworn affidavit testimony.” Lesnik, supra, quoting Ondo v. F. Gary Gieseke, P.A., 697 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The appellate court affirmed (explaining that reviewing trial court’s order striking the expert’s affidavit was an abuse of discretion standard of review and the trial court acted within its discretion).

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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