Preparing expert witnesses for deposition is vital. To this end, working with an expert witness to ensure their expert opinions fit within the context and theme of your case and burden of proof is equally vital. Not doing so can be fatal to your case. This can lead to unprepared testimony or opinions that may appear innocuous but are in fact detrimental to your claims.

For example, in the recent opinion in Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC, 41 Fla.L.Weekly D281a (Fla. 1^st DCA 2016), the plaintiff’s expert witness was deposed. The case involved a single vehicle accident where the plaintiff asserted claims against the dealership he purchased his used vehicle from. During deposition, the expert was asked specific questions and answered that he had no expert opinions as to those questions/issues. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In response to the motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of his expert. The problem, however, was that the expert rendered opinions in the affidavit that contradicted with his deposition testimony. In other words, he rendered opinions in the affidavit as to issues he previously testified that he had no expert opinions on. The trial court struck the affidavit based on the law that “a litigant when confronted with an adverse motion for summary judgment, may not contradict or disavow prior sworn testimony with contradictory sworn affidavit testimony.” Lesnik, supra, quoting Ondo v. F. Gary Gieseke, P.A., 697 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The appellate court affirmed (explaining that reviewing trial court’s order striking the expert’s affidavit was an abuse of discretion standard of review and the trial court acted within its discretion).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Please follow and like us:

I have discussed that hearsay is inadmissible evidence. Again, hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fla.Stat. 90.801(1)(c).

While hearsay is inadmissible, there are exceptions that allow hearsay to be admissible at trial.

One hearsay exception is known as an “excited utterance.” Typically, this hearsay exception is more applicable in criminal trials than civil trials. An excited utterance is a “statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Fla.Stat. 90.803(2). An excited utterance is admissible even though the declarant of the statement does not testify to making the statement at trial.

“There are three requirements for a statement to qualify as an excited utterance: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.”

Smith v. Florida, 2016 WL 64341, *4 (4^th DCA 2016) (internal quotation omitted).

For example, Smith was a murder trial. At trial, the murder victim’s daughter testified she called 911 and told the 911 operator that her aunt, the criminal defendant’s sister, told her that he seriously hurt the victim. The aunt then called 911 telling the operator that she saw blood and pleading with the operator to send help. In response to the 911 calls, the police discovered the victim stabbed to death.

At trial, the aunt denied making the statement to the victim’s daughter that the defendant told her that he seriously hurt the victim. The aunt, of course, was not the most credible since the defendant was her brother. The issue was whether the daughter could testify what the aunt told her (that the defendant told the aunt that he seriously hurt the vicim) since the statement constitutes hearsay.

The appellate court affirmed that the daughter could testify what the aunt told her since the aunt’s statement was an excited utterance: a) the startling event that caused the aunt’s nervous excitement was the thought that the victim was seriously hurt or dead; b) the aunt made the statement to the victim’s daughter immediately after she heard from her brother; and c) the statement was made before the aunt even called 911 so it was clearly made while the aunt was under the stress of the event and before there was time to make any misrepresentation. Further, the startling event the aunt experienced was supported by the aunt’s independent 911 call.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Please follow and like us:

Previously, I discussed the employment litigation case of Mootry v. Bethune-Cookman University, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D146a (Fla. 5^th DCA 2015) involving a terminated professor suing the University that fired him.   Check it out here. In this case, the University called an outside counsel as an expert employment attorney that advised it in the termination of the professor. The lawyer testified that in her expert opinion the University had cause to terminate the professor. The appellate court held it was error to admit this testimony because the testimony was essentially telling the jury how to decide the case, particularly, that the University did not breach the employment contract with the professor because it had authority to terminate his contract. “‘Witnesses will be prevented from expressing their conclusions when the opinion only tells the jury how to decide the case and does not help the jury to determine what occurred.” Mootry, supra, quoting Schneer v. Allstate Indem. Co., 767 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

In another example, Schneer, the underlying issue in the case was whether the insured perpetrated a fraud in submitting an insurance claim. The insured had an expert that was going to testify that no fraud had been committed by the insured. This expert testimony was properly excluded since “it had the effect of advising the jury how to decide this case [i.e., that no fraud had been committed by the insured], rather than assisting it in determining what had occurred.”  Schneer, supra. 

Considering and utilizing expert testimony is an important part of civil litigation.  Courts are the gatekeepers when it comes to admitting expert testimony so make sure you understand the expert opinion you are seeking and the admissibility requirements for that opinion.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Please follow and like us:

Sometimes, a party will try to introduce hearsay by arguing that that the document/testimony is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (hearsay), but instead, is being offered for another purpose. This is an avenue to admit evidence that would otherwise be excluded under the hearsay exclusion.  This was the situation in the employment litigation case, Mootry v. Bethune-Cookman University, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D146a (Fla. 5^th DCA 2015).

In this case, the University terminated a tenured professor for cause and the professor sued. At trial, the University offered into evidence a report prepared by an investigator that summarized an investigation into findings of sexual harassment committed by the professor by victims not named in the report. The professor argued that the report contains numerous hearsay statements, particularly, the sexual harassment allegations by the unnamed victims. The University, however, stated that the report was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was offered to establish the reasonableness of the University’s actions in terminating the professor’s employment.

The appellate court held that it was harmful error for the trial court to admit the report with the hearsay statements into evidence. The court held, “when an out-of-court statement is being ‘offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of its contents[, it] is admissible only when the purpose for which the statement is being offered is a material issue in the case.” Mootry, supra, quoting King v. State, 684 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1996).

The appellate court found that the reasonableness of the University’s actions was not a material issue in the dispute because the professor could only be properly terminated for cause if he breached his faculty agreement. The reasonableness of the University’s decision to terminate the professor had no bearing on whether the professor actually breached his faculty agreement. For this reason, the court held that the report was hearsay because it was actually being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted that the professor sexually harassed students.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Please follow and like us: