Florida has a worthless check statute (Florida Statute s. 68.065) that authorizes treble damages plus the original amount of the check owing if a party issues a worthless check.  This statute affords a strong civil remedy for a party (payee) that receives a worthless check. 

The statute provides in material portion:

In any civil action brought for the purpose of collecting a payment instrument, the payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds, lack of credit, or lack of an account, or where the maker or drawer stops payment on the instrument with intent to defraud, and where the maker or drawer fails to pay the amount owing, in cash, to the payee within 30 days after a written demand therefor, as provided in subsection (4), the maker or drawer is liable to the payee, in addition to the amount owing upon such payment instrument, for damages of triple the amount so owing.

Fla. Stat. s. 68.065(3)(a).

This is certainly a hefty punishment for issuing a worthless check. And, of course, this serves as a hopeful deterrent for a party not to issue a worthless check.

As the statute states, one way to issue a worthless check is where the maker “stops payment on the instrument with intent to defraud.” The recipient of the check (payee) still has to prove that the maker intended to defraud him/her/it by stopping payment on the check. This is typically a factual issue. See Sanders Farm of Ocala, Inc. v. Bay Area Truck Sales, Inc., 43 Fla. L. Weekly D73a (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (reversing summary judgment in favor of payee that received worthless check on de novo standard of appellate review because there was issue of fact as to whether maker stopped payment on a check with intent to defraud payee).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.Civ

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An order denying a motion for attorney’s fees is generally reviewed under a de novo standard of appellate review.  In a recent case I wrote about dealing with a coverage dispute between an insured and a property insurer, both the insured and insurer moved for attorney’s fees after the jury’s verdict.  

In this case, the insured moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to statute — Florida Statute s. 627.428.  The trial court denied the insured’s motion.  The insurer moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to a proposal for settlement / offer of judgment it served under Florida Statute s. 768.79.  The trial court denied the insurer’s motion too.  Both orders were appealed and reviewed by the appellate court under a de novo standard of appellate review.

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Jury trials do contain a degree of theatrics, particularly when it comes to opening and closing statements. The objective is to persuasively demonstrate to the jury your theme of the dispute – what the evidence will show (in the opening statement) and what the evidence reveals that supports your theme and the application of the law (in the closing statement). This does not mean, however, that you can intentionally and prejudicially inflame the passions of the jury. Doing so will result in a new trial, and oftentimes, an unnecessary new trial.

An example of this can be found in the case TT of Indian River, Inc. v. Fortson, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2655a (Fla. 5^th DCA 2017). This case involved an automobile accident where liability had been stipulated. The defendant was not interested in trying the liability of the case. The jury trial was ONLY as to damages. Liability was therefore irrelevant. Nonetheless, at trial, the plaintiff’s counsel, over the objection of the defense, called a corporate representative of the defendant and inquired as to issues concerning liability to create the perception that the defendant engaged in indifference and misconduct regarding the underlying automobile accident. The plaintiff also used the term of “guilt” to describe the defendant’s stipulation as to liability and the term of “innocence” to describe the plaintiff’s conduct.   After a final judgment was rendered against the defendant in accordance with the jury’ verdict, the defendant appealed for a new trial on damages. The appellate court agreed reversing the final judgment and mandating a new trial on damages due to conduct designed to inflame the jury.

When a defendant admits the entire responsibility for an accident and only the amount of damages is at issue, evidence regarding liability is irrelevant and prejudicial.  Moreover, as this court has recognized, it is improper to refer to “guilt” or “innocence” at a civil trial on negligence. 

Fortson, supra (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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