Arbitration, as a method of dispute resolution, is a creature of contract.  If you prefer to arbitrate disputes as opposed to litigating disputes in court, then you want a properly drafted arbitration provision in your contract.  If you want all disputes arising out of or relating to your contract to be arbitrated, then you want this specified in your contractual arbitration provision.  Conversely, if you want certain disputes not to be arbitrated or carved-out from arbitration, you want to clarify this in the arbitration provision.  The more clarity, the better, as it will avoid an issue down the road as to whether the dispute at-issue is subject to the arbitration provision.

Arbitration being a creature of contract was discussed in Vancore Construction, Inc. v. Osborn,43 Fla.L.Weekly D2769b (Fla. 5^thDCA 2018) (internal citations omitted), which dealt with a contract between a purchaser and a homebuilder. This case, in particular, discussed the difference between a narrow arbitration provision and a broad arbitration provision. It is good practice to understand the difference, specifically if you negotiate or enter into contracts that contain an arbitration provision. As stated by the Vancore Construction Court:

Because arbitration provisions are contractual in nature, they are subject to the rules of contract interpretation.  The determination whether a dispute must be arbitrated “turns on the parties’ intent,” which is manifested in the plain language of the contract itself.  In general, courts favor arbitration provisions and “will try to resolve an ambiguity in an arbitration provision in favor of arbitration.”  Thus, if the language of the arbitration provision is sufficiently broad, courts will apply a liberal construction and require arbitration. 

Two types of arbitration provisions have emerged — those that are narrow in scope and those that are broad in scope.  Narrow arbitration provisions generally require arbitration for claims or controversies “arising out of” the subject contract, whereas arbitration provisions that are broad in scope usually require arbitration for claims or controversies “arising out of or relating to” the subject contract. When a contract contains a narrow arbitration provision, arbitration is only required when a litigant’s claims have a direct relationshipwith the terms and provisions contained in the contract.  In contrast, when a contract contains a broad arbitration provision, the court will compel arbitration when the party’s claims have a “significant relationship” to the contract.  The test to determine whether a “significant relationship” exists has been described as follows:

A “significant relationship” between a claim and an arbitration provision does not necessarily exist merely because the parties in the dispute have a contractual relationship. Rather, a significant relationship is described to exist between an arbitration provision and a claim if there is a “contractual nexus” between the claim and the contract. A contractual nexus exists between a claim and a contract if the claim presents circumstances in which the resolution of the disputed issue requires either reference to, or construction of, a portion of the contract. More specifically, a claim has a nexus to a contract and arises from the terms of the contract if it emanates from an inimitable duty created by the parties’ unique contractual relationship. In contrast, a claim does not have a nexus to a contract if it pertains to the breach of a duty otherwise imposed by law or in recognition of public policy, such as a duty under the general common law owed not only to the contracting parties but also to third parties and the public.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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In a recent article I discussed the importance of an expert’s qualifications — hiring an expert witness to render an opinion within his or her qualifications (training, knowledge, or expertise).  If an expert is not qualified to render an opinion, a trial court has the discretion to preclude that witness from offering the opinion at trial. 

For this reason, the standard of review in an appeal where the trial court deemed a witness unqualified is abuse of discretion.  See White v. Ring Power Corp., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2729a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) citing Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 892 (Fla. 2000) (“holding it is ‘within the trial court’s discretion to determine a witness’s qualifications to express an opinion as an expert, and the court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.’”).   

In White v. Ring Power Corp., a trial court did not allow the plaintiff’s expert witnesses to render an opinion on a particular issue because the witnesses did not have the qualifications to do so.  They did not have the knowledge, training, or expertise to interpret the data for which their expert opinions were based.  Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court finding that the trial court did NOT abuse its discretion in precluding the expert opinions / testimony at trial.  

Hiring and selecting the right expert for your case is important.  The selection starts with the qualifications of the expert based on the subject matter you are looking for the witness to opine.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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While this hearsay exception is predominantly applicable in criminal trials, it is still worth mentioning the then-existing state of mind hearsay exception.  This is a hearsay exception where hearsay is admissible, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted by a declarant (the person that made the out-of-court statement), but the declarant’s then-existing state of mind.  Naturally, the declarant’s state of mind has to be at-issue for this exception to come into play.  

For example, in the criminal matter of Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WL 6331764 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), a pregnant woman requested her friend go to her neighbor’s apartment and stop them from playing loud music.  The friend did so and a fight ensued where a gun was brandished and discharged.  The friend was prosecuted for this incident. During the trial, the prosecution called the neighbors and they testified that the woman threatened to whoop them and she was going to send somebody to put a “cap in your a**.”   This testimony came in over the objection of the defense because the pregnant woman did not testify and she was not the defendant. 

The prosecution argued that the neighbor’s testimony about what the woman said to them was admissible to prove the then-existing state of mind of the defendant (friend of the woman).   But, there were two main problems.  

First, the prosecution used the statement to prove the then-existing state of mind of the defendant, not the woman (as she was not on trial). “It is well-settled, however, that this hearsay exception applies only to the declarant’s state of mind, not to someone else’s state of mind.”  Rodriguez, 2018 WL at *2 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Second, the woman was not the victim.  Thus, the neighbor’s testimony about what the woman said was not admissible to establish the declarant-victim’s state of mind since, again, the woman was not the victim. While the defendant-friend’s state of mind was an issue since he went to the neighbor’s house on behalf of the woman, the woman’s state of mind was not at-issue. 

Thus, the out-of-court statement of the woman (declarant) was hearsay and was improperly admitted since (i) the then-existing state of mind exception cannot be used to establish someone else’s state of mind, in this case the declarant’s friend, and (ii) it could not be used to establish the declarant-victim’s state of mind since the woman-declarant was not the victim.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Certain employment contracts will contain non-solicitation clauses.  Such clauses may be important if a company hires an employee for a specific project or purpose. Language may include that the employee agrees that she/he will NOT solicit employment with any other company associated with the project or purpose during the employment or a certain post-employment period.

For example, in Convergent Technologies, Inc. v. Stone, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2521a (Fla. 1^stDCA 2018), a company that provides cyber-security training for the US government entered into a subcontract to provide instructors for a program for Navy personnel.   The company hired employees to serve as instructors and made them sign non-solicitation agreements that the employees would not solicit employment with any other company associated with the program or six months after their employment period. 

During the course of the program, three employees left to join another subcontractor providing analagous services under the program.  The company then sued its former employees for violating the non-solicitation agreement.   The issue was whether the former employees’ behavior were proactive in soliciting employment with the other company, regardless of who made the initial contact (the employee or the other company). 

The First District Court of Appeals found this to be a question of fact: “[W]hether the terms of the non-solicitation agreements were violated here is largely predicated on the inferences to be drawn from the facts of Appellees’ [former employees] behavior prior to, and during, their negotiations with Epsilon [other company].”

When signing an employment agreement with a non-solicitation clause, it is important to consider the ramifications of the clause and how it could impact your employment, particularly if you are looking to explore other similar opportunities.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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While there are times I will serve a proposal for settlement to create an argument to recover attorney’s fees, I always tell clients proposals for settlement create nothing more than an argument.  In other words, you cannot bank on actually recovering attorney’s fees because of conflicting case law or case law that finds reasons to invalidate a proposal for settlement. Thus, when I serve a proposal for settlement, I make sure the client’s expectations are tempered.  But, when I receive a proposal for settlement on behalf of a client, I make sure the client appreciates that they can be liable for attorney’s fees regardless of the conflicting case law in effect.  Proposals for settlement, in my opinion, have become head scratchers. 

The case of Starboard Cruise Services, Inc. v. DePrince, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2581a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) exemplifies the confusing nature of proposals for settlement.  In this case, the defendant served a proposal for settlement conditioned on the plaintiff releasing all claims asserted in his amended complaint and dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.  The plaintiff’s amended complaint contained claims for monetary relief and a specific performance claim for equitable relief (where non-monetary damages were sought).  Prior to trial, the plaintiff dismissed his equitable claim and proceeded to trial only on his claim for monetary relief. The jury found in favor of the defendant and the defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees based on its proposal for settlement (that the plaintiff did not accept).  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees finding that the proposal for settlement was invalid since it applied to plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief and equitable relief. 

The appellate court agreed with the trial court finding that the defendant’s proposal for settlement was invalid because it was conditioned on the plaintiff releasing all his claims—his claims for monetary relief and his claim for equitable relief (where non-monetary relief was also sought).   A proposal for settlement only applies to claims for money damages.

Due consideration is required when serving a proposal for settlement.  Even with that consideration, there is still the possibility that the proposal for settlement will be deemed invalid, as was the circumstance in this case.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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