Worthy Discussion on Florida’s Summary Judgment Standard Modeled after Federal Standard
The Fourth District Court of Appeals in Kincaid v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 51 Fla.L.Weekly D495a (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) contains an important discussion on Florida’s summary judgment standard that is worth sharing after Florida adopted the federal summary judgment standard:
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, as amended May 1, 2021, revised Florida’s summary judgment rule to align with the federal summary judgment standard. Our Supreme Court explained that Florida would now follow the Celotex trilogy from the United States Supreme Court.
This change was meant to “recognize the fundamental similarity between the summary judgment standard and the directed verdict standard.” “Both standards focus on whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” “And under both standards, the substantive evidentiary burden of proof that the respective parties must meet at trial is the only touchstone that accurately measures whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to be tried.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Put differently, “[t]o survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party bearing the ultimate burden of proof at trial must come forward with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion.”
Summary judgment is thus proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
To defeat summary judgment, then, there must be “some alleged factual dispute between the parties” shown to be both “material” and “genuine.”
A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” and thus “properly preclude[s] the entry of summary judgment.” “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”
A dispute of fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” “In Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain that the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the slightest doubt is raised.” “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” There must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Further, “a moving party that does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial can obtain summary judgment without disproving the nonmovant’s case.” “[T]here is ‘no express or implied requirement . . . that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.’ ” Rather, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Thus, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Where, as is common in motions for summary judgment, the moving party (often the defendant) does not bear the burden of proof at trial, that “initial burden” is “not onerous.” “Where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial on a particular issue, the requirements that Rule 56 imposes on the moving party are not onerous. . . . The movant’s initial burden of production in this circumstance is far from stringent and can be regularly discharged with ease.”
“Only when that [initial] burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.”
Thus, where the movant clears the initial burden, it is ultimately the burden of a non-moving party that bears the burden of proof at trial to demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact exist, and that summary judgment should not be granted.
Kincaid, supra (internal citations omitted)
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