Good Overview of Florida’s Summary Judgment Standard
Below is a good overview of Florida’s summary judgment standard with citations. The last paragraph discusses how a Court should construe legal texts such as contracts, particularly if there is a dispute as to a word in the contract:
We review summary judgments de novo. Pial Holdings, LTD v. Riverfront Plaza, LLC, 379 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). Florida’s summary judgment standard now aligns with the federal standard. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a); In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. 2021) (adopting federal summary judgment rule and standard and citing “Celotex trilogy,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). In applying the new standard, we “must be guided not only by the Celotex trilogy, but by the overall body of case law interpreting federal rule 56.” See In re Amends., 317 So. 3d at 76.
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, . . . affidavits or declarations, . . . or other materials . . . .” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(1)(A). Thus, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the lack of a genuinely disputed issue of material fact.” Brevard Cnty. v. Waters Mark Dev. Enters., LC, 350 So. 3d 395, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991). “Until the moving party has met that burden, the nonmoving party is not obliged to prove or disprove anything.” Baum v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 351 So. 3d 185, 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).
“In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve any reasonable doubts in that party’s favor.” Brevard Cnty., 350 So. 3d at 398. A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[D]isputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party . . . .” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
In interpreting legal texts, we “follow the supremacy-of-text principle — namely, the principle that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Thus, we interpret written agreements according to the plain meaning of their text, looking to “all the textual and structural clues that bear on the meaning of a disputed text” and using the traditional interpretive canons for guidance where helpful. Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (cleaned up). When a contested contractual term is not defined in the contract, we presume the term bears its ordinary meaning at the time of contracting, in context, and we look to both legal and non-legal dictionaries for evidence of that ordinary meaning. See State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 472 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025); People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Gunsser, 373 So. 3d 422, 429 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023).
16205 Captiva Drive, LLC v. Levinson, 50 Fla.L.Weekly D1702c (Fla. 6th DCA 2025).
According to the legal text 16205 Captiva Drive, a party could terminate an easement if the other party did not pay its share of the maintenance within 30 days of receipt of the demand for payment. However, there was no notice provision in the written agreement as to where the demand for payment should be sent. Public records demonstrated there were two addresses, but the demand was only sent to one of the addresses for which the party claimed they did not receive. This created a disputed issue of material fact. The operative words in the contract were “receipt of the demand for payment,” and per the appellate court: “the LLC’s receipt of the payment demand was a condition precedent to its obligation to pay, and the LLC’s failure to pay the demand after receipt was a condition precedent to termination of the easements. … In the context of the 1996 easement agreement, the ordinary meaning of “receipt” is “[t]he fact of being or having been received.” The ordinary meaning of “receive” is “[t]o take or acquire (something given, offered, or transmitted); get.”. The legal dictionary meanings are similar. Thus, the condition precedent of “receipt” is satisfied by the LLC’s getting or taking possession of the Trust’s payment demand.” 16205 Captiva Drive, LLC v. Levinson, 50 Fla.L.Weekly D1702c (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (internal citations omitted). Because there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether the party received the demand for payment, summary judgment was improper.
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