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Appeal

Party Recovering Judgment Entitled to Recoverable Costs

Posted by David Adelstein on October 12, 2019
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Party Recovering Judgment Entitled to Recoverable Costs

Florida Statute s. 57.041(1) provides, “The party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment; but this section does not apply to executors or administrators in actions when they are not liable for costs.” 

Thus, in most cases, when it comes to the recovery of recoverable costs, if you obtain a judgment against the other party, you are entitled to such costs under section 57.041.   There is no analysis as to which party truly prevailed in the case (which is oftentimes the analysis when dealing with attorney’s fees). See Sherman v. Sherman, 2019 WL 4658446, *5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“Under section 57.041(1), costs should be awarded to the ‘party recovering judgment.’”).  If you recover a judgment in your favor, you should be entitled to recoverable costs. 

When a trial court denies a party’s costs, there is a de novo standard of appellate review.  See Sherman, 2019 WL at *2.  Also, when a party is appealing the excessiveness of the costs awarded to the opposing party that recovers a judgment in its favor, there is a de novo standard of appellate review.  Id.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

 

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Amended Complaints and the “Relation Back” Doctrine

Posted by David Adelstein on October 05, 2019
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Amended Complaints and the “Relation Back” Doctrine

There is a doctrine known as the “relation back” doctrine that refers to amended complaints and the statute of limitations.  Assume an original complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitations.  Assume after the statute of limitations expired, an amended complaint is asserted with new claims.  Do the new claims in the amended complaint RELATE BACK to the original complaint so that the new claims are deemed filed within the statute of limitations? 

The recent opinion in Mitchell v. Applebee’s Services, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2443a (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) explains Florida’s liberal policy in answering this question:

Whether an amended complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes is a question of law subject to de novo review. Caduceus Props., LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 991 (Fla. 2014). As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Caduceus:

Generally, Florida has a judicial policy of freely permitting amendments to the pleadings so that cases may be resolved on the merits, as long as the amendments do not prejudice or disadvantage the opposing party. . . .

Permitting relation back in this context is also consistent with Florida case law holding that [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.190(c) is to be liberally construed and applied.

Id. at 991-92.

In other words, as long as the initial complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the general factual scenario or factual underpinning of the claim, amendments stating new legal theories can relate back . . . even where the legal theory of recovery has changed or where the original and amended claims require the assertion of different elements.

Mitchell, supra.

The key inquiry to determine whether an amendment relates back or is barred by the statute of limitations is whether the party in question had notice of the litigation during the limitations period under the original pleadings and the amendment merely adjusts the status of an existing party, or the amendment actually introduces a new defendant.Id. quoting HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Karzen, 157 So.3d 1089, 1091-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

When it comes to amended complaints filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations, it is one thing if you are amending a complaint to assert a claim against a new party.  It is another if you are amending a complaint to add claims against existing defendants based on the same transactions and occurrences as the original complaint.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

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Improperly Moving to Set Aside the Verdict

Posted by David Adelstein on September 22, 2019
Appeal / Comments Off on Improperly Moving to Set Aside the Verdict

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.480 governs motions for directed verdict and motions to set aside the verdict and to enter judgment pursuant to the directed verdict:

(a) Effect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the adverse party may offer evidence in the event the motion is denied without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. The denial of a motion for a directed verdict shall not operate to discharge the jury. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order directing a verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.

(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. When a motion for a directed verdict is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Within 15 days after the return of a verdict, a party who has timely moved for a directed verdict may serve a motion to set aside the verdict and any judgment entered thereon and to enter judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. If a verdict was not returned, a party who has timely moved for a directed verdict may serve a motion for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict within 15 days after discharge of the jury.

(c) Joined with Motion for New Trial. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion or a new trial may be requested in the alternative. If a verdict was returned, the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned, the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.

The recent opinion in TLO South Farms, Inc. v. Heartland Farms, Inc., 44 Fla.L.Weekly D2385a (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), demonstrates what can happen if a defendant improperly moves to set aside a verdict based on a motion for directed verdict.  

In this case, a defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.  The court reserved ruling.  Due to the reservation, the defendant put on evidence to support its case.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant filed a motion per Rule 1.480(b) to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in favor of the defendant per its motion for directed verdict. The defendant, also, per Rule 1.480(c), joined the motion with an alternative motion for a new trial. 

The trial court granted the motion to set aside the verdict and also granted the alternative motion for a new trial subject to the appeal (i.e., if the appellate court reverses the order to set aside the verdict, then the alternative motion for a new trial is granted).   The Second District reversed the trial court in entirety and remanded for the trial court to reinstate the jury’s verdict.  The appellate court’s basis for reversal, discussed below, is important to know.

Setting Aside the Verdict

 

The reason supporting the reversal as to the order to set aside the verdict was because the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict per Rule 1.480(b) was based on an argument the defendant did NOT raise in its motion for directed verdict.  See TLO South Farms, supra (“[T]he trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict and entering judgment in [defendant’s] favor on the FDUTPA [Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act] count based on their newly raised posttrial challenge to the evidence….”).  You cannot raise a new argument posttrial that was not raised in the motion for directed verdict.

Alternative Motion Granting New Trial

 

The trial court granted the alternative motion for new trial based on two issues: (i) the verdict on the Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice’s Act’s (“FDUTPA”) claim was inconsistent with the verdict on the negligence claim and (ii) the verdict on the FDUTPA claim was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  

Regarding the first issue, the appellate court held that the defendant waived this argument because it never objected to inconsistent verdicts on the FDUTPA and negligence counts prior to the discharge of the jury.

Regarding the second issue, the appellate court held that a “trial court may order a new trial when the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence…[only when] the evidence is clear, obvious, and indisputable.”  TLO South Farms, supra (internal citations and quotations omitted).   The appellate court held the trial record did not support a ruling that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

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Arbitration Provision Involving Non-Florida Entities and a Non-Florida Transaction

Posted by David Adelstein on September 02, 2019
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Arbitration Provision Involving Non-Florida Entities and a Non-Florida Transaction

It is permissible for non-Florida persons/entities to agree to arbitration in Florida.  Such arbitration agreement will be enforceable and Florida courts can enforce the arbitration agreement even if the underlying transaction is conducted outside of Florida.

Section 682.18(1) of Florida’s Arbitration Code provides in material part:

The making of an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law and providing for arbitration in this state shall, made within or outside this state, confer jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement or provision under this law, to enter judgment on an award duly rendered in an arbitration thereunder and to vacate, modify or correct an award rendered thereunder for such cause in the manner provided in this law.

This was at-issue in the opinion, Ancla International, S.A. v. Tribeca Asset Management, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2189a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), involving two non-Florida entities dealing with an out-of-country transaction.  Here, a Columbian company (owned by a Florida resident) entered into an agreement with a Panamanian company.  The underlying transaction was to occur in Columbia.  

The agreement contained the following arbitration provision:

SEVENTH. APPLICABLE LAW. This agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of Florida of the United States of America (USA), a jurisdiction accepted by the parties irrespective of the fact that the principal activity of the beer project will be conducted in Colombia. The parties agree that, in the event that differences arise between them as a result of or in relation to the present Agreement, they will attempt to resolve their differences via direct negotiation. For this purpose, the parties will have a period of thirty (30) business days, counting from the date on which either of the parties presents a request in this regard. This term may be extended by mutual agreement for additional thirty-day periods. If a solution is not reached within these stipulated periods, the differences will be submitted to an Arbitration Board, whose ruling with carry the force of law.

Although this provision is perhaps not a model of clarity relative to arbitration, the issue was whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant to compel the parties to arbitration.   The parties agreed that personal jurisdiction stemmed from s. 682.18(1) of Florida’s Arbitration Act.  The Third District Court of Appeal held that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant “[b]ecause the parties accepted the power of Florida courts to enforce the Agreement.”   Ancla International, supra.   Hence, a Florida court could enforce the parties’ agreement to compel the parties to arbitration even though they are non-Florida entities dealing with a non-Florida transaction.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Standard for Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Posted by David Adelstein on August 18, 2019
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To invoke an appellate court’s certiorari jurisdiction, [t]he petitioning party must demonstrate that the contested order constitutes (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal.

State Farm Florida Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 44 Fla.L.Weekly D1901a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) quoting Rousso v. Hannon, 146 So.3d 66, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 

This is the standard for a petition for writ of certiorari.

An example of an appellate court granting a petition for writ of certiorari and quashing a trial court’s order can be found in State Farm Florida Ins. Co. v. Sanders, which dealt with a property insurance coverage dispute. 

In this case, after the policyholder filed a lawsuit against his insurer, the insurer filed a motion to compel the parties to the appraisal process mandated by the property insurance policy.  An issue arose as to the parties’ selection of “disinterested” appraisers as required by the policy.  The policyholder wanted to use his public adjuster, which the insurer contested because the public adjuster is hardly disinterested – he is an agent for the policyholder. Notwithstanding, the trial court entered an order allowing the policyholder’s public adjuster to serve as the disinterested appraiser prompting the insurer to file a petition for writ of certiorari.

The appellate court granted the petition because allowing the public adjuster to serve as a disinterested appraiser is a harm that could NOT be corrected in a post-judgment appeal. A major reason for this is the nature of the property insurance appraisal process is a binding process, as more particularly outlined in the property insurance policy. 

If you are considering filing a petition for writ of certiorari, know the standard you need to satisfy to get the appellate court to entertain the petition and quash the trial court’s order.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Striking an Affirmative Defense

Posted by David Adelstein on June 30, 2019
Appeal, Standard of Review / Comments Off on Striking an Affirmative Defense

I recently discussed the property insurance coverage dispute, American Integrity Insurance Company v. Estrada, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1639a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), which deals with an insured’s forfeiture of post-loss policy obligations in a property insurance policy.    Yet, in a different context, this case deals with a trial court striking a defendant’s (insurer) affirmative defense and precluding the defendant (insurer) from amending its affirmative defense prior to trial.

The standard of review of an order striking an affirmative defense is abuse of discretion. An order denying a defendant’s motion to amend its affirmative defenses is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Estrada, supra (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the jury was not able to consider the application of an affirmative defense because the trial court struck the affirmative defense prior to trial.  The trial court also would not allow the defendant to amend the affirmative defense.  There would not have been any prejudice to the plaintiff in allowing an amendment since the substance of the amended defense was based on facts already in the record. “Because we are unable to conclude that this error was harmless and that the jury would have rejected this defense, we are compelled to reverse the final judgment on review and remand for a new trial.”  Estrada, supra.  Stated differently, the appellate court ordered a new trial because the jury was not able to consider this affirmative defense and there was nothing to indicate the jury would have rejected this defense (had the jury considered it). 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Involuntary Dismissal should have been Granted because Damages Rested with LLC and Not Its Member

Posted by David Adelstein on November 17, 2018
Appeal, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Involuntary Dismissal should have been Granted because Damages Rested with LLC and Not Its Member

During a bench trial, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.  The defendant argued the plaintiff had no standing.  The trial court denied the motion and a judgment was ultimately entered in favor of the plaintiff.  The defendant appealed.  On appeal, the appellate court reviews on a de novo standard of appellate review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal.  In doing so, the trial court reversed the trial judge with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.  Why?

Well, this case involved a member of a limited liability company (LLC), the plaintiff, filing a lawsuit against a third-party, the defendant, due to a real estate transaction.  The overriding problem for the plaintiff was that the damages he was suing for were damages associated with his LLC, and not him individually. “Generally, a shareholder of a corporation or a member of an LLC may not maintain an action in his or her own right if the cause of action is derived from the right of the corporation or the LLC to bring the action.” Home Title Co. of Maryland, Inc. v. LaSalla, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2561a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).  Because the plaintiff (member of the LLC) was suing for damages that directly belonged to the LLC, the cause of action rested with the corporation.  Id. (“The property belonged to the LLC, and thus, the LLC suffered the direct harm when Home Title [third-party] transferred the property…Even though LaSalla [plaintiff-member] is the only other member of the LLC who suffered as a result of the transfer, the harm to him individually was indirect and the result of the harm to the LLC.”). 

The moral of this case is make sure you have standing to sue for the damages/injuries you are suing for.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Appealing Correct Measure of Damages

Posted by David Adelstein on September 29, 2018
Appeal, Evidence / Comments Off on Appealing Correct Measure of Damages

In an earlier article, I wrote how economic damages MUST be supported by substantial competent evidence. 

In a recent case, Levy v. Ben-Shmuel, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2229a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), a plaintiff, after a bench trial, recovered a judgment against a defendant that included money damages associated with a claim for conversion.  During trial, and after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal arguing the plaintiff failed to meet its burden in establishing the correct measure of damages at trial.  On appeal, the plaintiff ultimately conceded that he did not establish the correct measure of damages.  The issue was whether the plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial.  The Third District held NO!  The plaintiff is NOT entitled to a new trial on damages:

We also write to clarify the law within this [Third] district, and hold, as a general rule, that where this court determines, on appeal from a properly preserved claim, that a party failed to meet its burden of establishing the correct measure of damages at trial, that party is not entitled on remand to a new trial on damages, unless that party’s failure to meet its burden was the result of judicial error.

Levy, supra (“The generally prevailing rule is that a party will not be permitted a new trial on remand to remedy its own failure to present sufficient evidence to support its claim.”).

It is worth noting that in a bench trial, “the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment may be raised on appeal whether or not the party raising the question [objection] has made any objection thereto in the trial court or made a motion for rehearing, for new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment.”  Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.530(e).   Thus, in a bench trial, a party can challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal.  In Levy, the defendant had actually moved for an involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, but had he not done so, the objection to the sufficiency of evidence would still have been properly preserved for appeal.  

A jury trial, however, is different.  In a jury trial, “where a defendant fails to timely move for a directed verdict [as the sufficiency of evidence], and raises this issue for the first time in a motion for new trial, the proper remedy upon reversal and remand is a new trial.”  Levy, supra, n. 2.  Hence, in a jury trial, if a defendant does timely move for a directed verdict on such an issue, then the proper remedy is to enter judgment in favor of the defendant as the plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial. Id.  But, if the defendant first raises such an issue for the first time in a motion for new trial, then the proper remedy would be a new trial.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Quick Note: Competent Substantial Evidence to Support Mitigation of Damages

Posted by David Adelstein on September 15, 2018
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I recently discussed the defense of mitigation of damages as it applies to contract cases.  An issue dealt with whether an owner failed to mitigate his damages after his contractor walked off the job and breached the construction contract.  In the case referenced in the article, the trial court did not award the owner certain damages at trial finding that the owner should have mitigated his damages.  The owner appealed this issue which was reversed on appeal.  The reason it was reversed is because the trial court’s finding that the owner failed to mitigate his damages is reviewed on appeal for competent substantial evidence.  If competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, the ruling would not be disturbed on appeal. At trial, however, there was NO competent substantial evidence presented by the contractor that the owner failed to mitigate his damages. Forbes v. Prime General Contractors, Inc., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2094a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“Here, there is no competent substantial evidence that the Forbeses [owner] could have taken any measure without undue effort or expense to avoid [mitigate] the damages they sought.”).

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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Sufficient Factual Detail to Support Four Prongs of Temporary Injunction

Posted by David Adelstein on August 20, 2018
Appeal, Standard of Review, Trial Perspectives / Comments Off on Sufficient Factual Detail to Support Four Prongs of Temporary Injunction

An order on a motion for temporary injunction entered by a trial court must be based on [1] the likelihood of irreparable harm, [2] the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, [3] the substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and [4] considerations of public interest.”  XIP Technologies, LLC v. Ascend Global Services, LLC,  43 Fla.L.Weekly D1850a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).  A trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction must contain clear factual detail to support each of these four prongsId.

A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for temporary injunction.  Its discretion, however, is not absolute and will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review.  It will be deemed an abuse of discretion if an injunction is issued where the moving party has an adequate remedy at law or there has not been strict compliance with the factual detail needed to support the injunction.

In XIP Technologies, LLC, a defendant provided software that allowed the plaintiff to accept credit card payments from its customers and tracked all customer information, transactions, and purchases.  Due to a dispute, the defendant stopped transferring credit card payments to the plaintiff, stopped providing the plaintiff the tracked customer data, and stopped accepting credit card payments from the plaintiff’s customers.  The plaintiff stopped paying the defendant the required monthly fee for the software.  The plaintiff sued the defendant and moved for a temporary injunction that, among other things, required the defendant to pay the plaintiff the withheld credit card payment amounts, provide the plaintiff the tracked customer data, and continue to accept credit card payments from the plaintiff’s customers. The trial court granted the injunction.

On appeal, the defendant argued that it was wrong to order it to pay the plaintiff the withheld credit card payments because that payment constitutes an adequate remedy at law and injunctive relief is only when a party does NOT have an adequate remedy at law.  The appellate court agreed:  “If indeed XIP [defendant] is determined to be in breach of the parties’ contract, Ascend [plaintiff] will have an adequate remedy at law in the form of damages to replace the withheld revenue.  Because damages are available, there is no irreparable harm.” XIP Technologies, LLC, supra

The appellate court, on the other hand, found that injunctive relief could be appropriate relating to the customer data and refusal of the defendant to continue to process credit card payments of the plaintiff’s customers.   However, the trial court’s order was insufficient in that it did NOT contain sufficient factual detail supporting all of the four prongs to justify the issuance of a temporary injunction.  In particular, the trial court’s order did not include factual detail regarding requirements 3 (the substantial likelihood of success on the merits) and 4 (considerations of public interest).  For this reason, as to these issues, the appellate court remanded back to the trial court to enter a temporary injunction as to these issues “but only if it includes the required findings as to each of the necessary four prongs.”  XIP Technologies, LLC, supra.  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

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